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INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers and legal scholars in law and development have failed to 
understand that law is peripheral, not central, to the development prob-
lem of poor countries. Even as legal scholars in other fields increasingly 
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recognize the need to study norms and the interaction of norms and 
law,1 law and development scholars remain seemingly blind to this phe-
nomenon. In this Article, I argue that norms matter, or more controver-
sially, culture matters to law and development. The observation, that 
culture matters, and the proposal, that it be examined and evaluated, run 
counter to the tradition of public and private international law. Law and 
development, however, must disassociate itself from this long-standing 
tradition. 
In this Article, I seek to address how culture aids or retards economic 
development and propose that the field of law and development pursue 
the objective of purposive culture change. Law and development schol-
ars have yet to ask the key question: after so many years of drafting new 
laws to spur development, why is the field still characterized by failure? 
Does it need more laws, especially if “law” is viewed in essentially in-
strumentalist terms, that is, as a means to an end—whether it be to 
lower transaction costs or protect parties’ expectations or restrain state 
power. 
I propose that law and development move beyond law and the techni-
cal dimensions of the “rule of law.” As slippery a concept as culture 
may be and as complex and controversial as the notion of culture 
change undoubtedly is, particularly given the history of colonialism, I 
argue that we must enter the cultural milieu and ask whether certain cul-
tural attributes in a given society are an impediment to that society’s 
economic development. Law may still be relevant, but only if it is also 
viewed culturally, and not just instrumentally, “as the embodiment of 
norms…and the repository of social meanings.”2 If law embodies or re-
flects norms, then norms must accordingly be addressed, especially 
those that may be at odds with development objectives. 
Law and development assistance must therefore confront even issues 
that seem to be part of a country’s proclaimed cultural identity. Exam-
ples include specific practices: India’s caste system and the preferences 
of many generations of high caste Indians for economic and social seg-
regation; restrictions on education for girls in many poor countries; the 
prohibition on charging interest because it is an essential part of the “Is-
lamic way of life”; personalistic and group-focused relationships as well 
as patterns of authority that discourage individual wealth accumulation, 
 
1. For an examination of law/norm interaction, see Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and 
Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 857–74 (1999). 
2. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 
53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 973–74 (2005). 
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especially by those not from the traditional ruling elites. Additionally, 
this Article advocates confronting not just specific practices but also 
general inclinations, values, preferences or mindsets that do not contrib-
ute positively towards economic development. Examples include views 
about authority and dominance, status as an inherited rather than ac-
quired attribute; the relationship between the collective and the individ-
ual; superstitions and the tendency to exalt the past. My argument to fo-
cus on culture rests on the following claim—that economic 
development is not only an economic or legal process but also a “cul-
tural process.”3 A “rule of law” project as such will be insufficient to re-
duce poverty or implement the other objectives of law and development. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sketches the field, its sup-
posed demise and its revival in recent years. This resurrection is due 
partly to the events of September 11, 2001, whereby law and develop-
ment is viewed in a new light, in the United States in particular, not just 
as a do-good effort but as a crucial component in the fight against ter-
rorism. I argue this effort will fail without a cultural focus. Part II exam-
ines how international law has focused on states and ignored culture, 
except as a byproduct of the colonial project and its civilizing mission. 
To the extent culture is now incorporated at all, it is presumed that cul-
tures cannot be changed or interfered with but rather are to be protected 
as part of the right to self-determination. Part III argues that notwith-
standing colonial history, law and development must go beyond market 
initiatives and legal reforms to include a cultural component, especially 
where “‘cultural lock-in’”4 is a contributing cause of continuing poverty. 
In making this argument, I refer to various historical instances of cul-
ture transformations, in response to both internal and external ferment, 
to suggest how a culture change agenda may be undertaken. Japan’s 
modernization is one such example. I also examine current efforts to 
transform practices and attitudes that are cultural but are also detrimen-
tal to economic development. In the process, this Article wrestles with 
the following dilemmas: whether and how these practices and beliefs 
should be changed, in a manner that may begin with passing the neces-
sary laws but also has to go beyond “mere” laws; and how new norms 
can be introduced, especially those that run counter to patterns of 
 
3. Mariano Grondona, A Cultural Typology of Economic Development, in CULTURE 
MATTERS 44, 46 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000).  
4. Timur Kuran, Cultural Obstacles to Economic Development: Often Overstated, Usually 
Transitory, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 115, 117 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 
2004). 
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thought and behavior that people have experienced most of their lives. 
Accordingly, this Article will address complications that may arise when 
culture change is externally influenced or induced. 
Part III is only the beginning of a larger scholarly project in which I 
address both the normative and prescriptive dimensions of culture 
change. In addition to the “how to” or “tool kit” aspects of culture 
change, there are also normative implications. Clearly, a disturbing ten-
sion runs through the proposal. On the one hand, development ideally 
should have grassroots participation and support,5 and development ob-
jectives should be subjected to “informed choice, aided by public dis-
cussion, critical scrutiny, and a participatory political environment.”6 On 
the other hand, participatory development in communities characterized 
by hierarchical patterns of authority may also be susceptible to capture 
by the traditional elites themselves, calling for a return to, not surpris-
ingly, traditional culture. 
In the age of globalization, culture is not likely to remain “pure” 
(even assuming it once was), and arguments about cultural purity and 
autonomy are not convincing. Culture is neither homogeneous nor 
monolithic; indeed, even within a culture, people are dissenting from 
and contesting inherited cultural norms and meanings.7 As the noted 
economist and 1998 Nobel Laureate in Economics Amartya Sen re-
marked, “the cultural dimension of development requires closer scrutiny 
in development analysis. It is important to investigate the different 
ways…in which culture should be taken into account in examining the 
challenges of development, and in assessing the demands of sound eco-
nomic strategies.”8 
Although law does have an expressive function and thus certain laws 
make certain statements which could in turn influence social norms,9 
 
5. The World Bank has recently initiated a Comprehensive Development Framework which 
promotes greater local participation in development projects, particularly from Nongovernmental 
Organizations. See Lan Cao, An Evaluation of the World Bank’s New Comprehensive Develop-
ment Framework, in PRIVATISING DEVELOPMENT 27 (Michael B. Likosky ed., 2005);see also 
Amartya Sen, How Does Culture Matter?, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 37, 
53 (“An overarching value must be the need for participatory decision making on the kind of so-
ciety people want to live in, based on open discussion….”). 
6. Sen, supra note 5, at 55. 
7. See generally Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001) (arguing 
that law should recognize the heterogeneity within a culture and should not reflexively privilege 
the cultural authenticity claims of elites against dissenters who wish to transform aspects of that 
culture). 
8. Sen, supra note 5, at 37. 
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–
25 (1996). 
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this capacity to affect preferences and beliefs through law is question-
able in countries where the rule of law is itself weak. For those coun-
tries, law is insufficient and culture change will be needed. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. Law and Development After 9/11: Development as National 
Security 
Law and development as a field has been revived after many years of 
decline and disillusionment.10 The crisis was partly fueled by the events 
of the 1960s when Western institutions were deemed flawed11 and 
many, particularly those intimately associated with the movement, ques-
tioned the objectives of law and development12 and the institution of 
law itself.13 In other words, if law and development scholars aimed to 
assist poor countries in establishing Western style markets and laws,14 
and if the integrity of the latter is questioned even in developed, Western 
societies,15 then the essence of the movement itself must be questioned 
as well.16 
 
10. See, e.g., LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala 
eds., 1993); John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, De-
cline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); David 
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WISC. L. REV. 1062 (1974). 
11. For a critique of the law and development movement and its self-proclaimed crisis and 
despair, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 470, 472 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (VOL. 2, LEGAL CULTURES, Anthony 
Carty ed., 1992) and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note 10.). 
12. David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society 
Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 23 (1990) (characterizing the law and development move-
ment as one aimed at “exporting democratic capitalism” to countries “too poor or benighted to 
grasp the possibilities of this superior form of civilization”). 
13. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1083–84. 
14. See David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and 
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1972) (describing how law is necessary to the establishment 
of markets because law provides predictable, universal rules, thus ensuring that economic activi-
ties and fruits generated therefrom will be protected). More specifically, law and development 
scholars supported the establishment in developing countries of capital market programs to foster 
Western-style regulatory and private property regimes. Id. at 45–46. 
15. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1083 (claiming that, even in the United States, 
law is instrumental in perpetuating “domination by elite groups” and “arbitrary actions by gov-
ernment”). For a compelling criticism of Western disillusionment, see Tamanaha, supra note 11, 
at 474. 
16. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1070, 1080 (condemning the liberal-legalism 
model previously advocated as “ethnocentric and naïve” because the model is ignorant of the re-
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Law and development was revived by the demise of the Soviet Union 
and the need to aid transitional or post-crisis countries. Despite pro-
fessed concerns about the project’s basic premise—to modernize devel-
oping countries—the thrust of law and development continues to be 
about modernization,17 which is essentially to establish working markets 
and construct a rule of law framework.18 Since September 11, 2001, law 
and development has taken on an even greater sense of urgency. Interna-
tional security experts view it as a necessary component of terrorism 
prevention.19 Some argue that the United States has traditionally com-
bated terrorism by using a “supply-side” only approach that is ineffec-
tive, that is, by “regarding terrorism as the product of organized groups 
that could be confronted and destroyed, without regard to their aims or 
to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing members.”20 
These commentators suggest that the United States should also engage 
the “demand side” of terrorism, that is, by understanding that “[p]ublic 
despair and humiliation are often fertile ground for terror organizers to 
exploit”21 and by addressing those underlying factors through support 
for economic development and political change.22 One reason “the Mid-
dle East is a prime target for terrorist recruiters”23 is “its exceedingly 
high unemployment rate, evaporating gross domestic product growth, 
                                                                                                                                      
alities of Third World countries). 
17. Modernization theory holds that “development was an inevitable, evolutionary process of 
increasing societal differentiation that would ultimately produce economic, political and social 
institutions similar to those in the West. The outcome of this process would be the creation of a 
free market system, liberal democratic political institutions, and the rule of law.” Tamanaha, su-
pra note 11, at 471; see also Lan Cao, Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?, 32 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 545, 549 (1997) (describing how modernization theory views development as a 
sequential process similar to that experienced by the West). 
18. Often “rule of law” is used synonymously with “law and development.” That is because 
rule of law is the legal component of market development. Development increasingly means mar-
ket development (or at least reliance on the market as an engine for growth and development) and 
rule of law is the institution, at the very least, of laws that will support such market development 
and, among other objectives, restrain arbitrary governmental actions. See, e.g. John Hewko, For-
eign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter? (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, 
Working Paper No. 26, 2002), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files /wp26.pdf; 
Stephen Holmes, Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law?, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1999, at 
68 (“Essentially, law is seen as a springboard to economic development,” and therefore efforts 
have been devoted at providing a secure contracts and property framework in order to develop a 
free market.). 
19. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IRAQ: THE DAY AFTER (2003). 
20. Shibley Telhami, Conflicting Views of Terrorism, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 581, 586 (2002). 
21. Id. at 587. 
22. Id. at 598. 
23. Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror Without 
the War, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 587, 599–600 (2004). 
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and lack of free markets and stable financial institutions.”24 
The idea that economic development is part of a wider political solu-
tion resonated after September 11 and was embraced not only by schol-
ars25 but also by governments and aid agencies. At the highest level of 
the U.S. government, officials such as then Secretary of State Colin 
Powell drew the connection between the national security of the United 
States and economic development of poor countries. As Secretary Pow-
ell put it, in considering the Bush Administration’s foreign policy re-
cord, there are “issues…that tend to dominate the headlines, and issues 
of equal or greater long-term strategic significance that rarely generate 
as much interest. Among these latter issues, none is more important than 
economic development in the world’s poorest societies.”26 Although 
poverty is not a direct cause of terrorism, “[p]overty breeds frustration 
and resentment, which ideological entrepreneurs can turn into support 
for—or acquiescence to—terrorism, particularly in those countries in 
which poverty is coupled with a lack of political rights and basic free-
doms.”27 According to Secretary Powell, “[d]evelopment is not a ‘soft’ 
policy issue, but a core national security issue,”28 and “[t]he United 
States cannot win the war on terrorism unless we confront the social and 
political roots of poverty.”29 
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. actions have reflected the recognition 
that “development, democracy, and security [are] inextricably linked.”30 
The United States, for example, passed the Export-Import Bank Reau-
thorization Act of 2002 with new guidelines that require the Bank, in 
determining whether to accept an application for credit from a foreign 
nation, to take into consideration the cooperation of the host govern-
ment in the fight against terrorism.31 The United States Agency for In-
 
24. Id. at 599. 
25. See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 23, at 609 (“Eradicating poverty is the single most potent so-
lution to the problem of terrorism.”); Oren Gross, Mending Walls: The Economic Aspects of Is-
raeli-Palestinian Peace, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1539 (2000); Brink Lindsey, The Trade Front: 
Combating Terrorism with Open Markets, TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 24 (CATO Inst. Center 
for Trade Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.), August 5, 2003, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/ 
tpa-024.pdf (arguing that the United States should pursue a broad trade strategy as a component in 
the war on terror); Telhami, supra note 20. 
26. Colin L. Powell, No Country Left Behind, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 28. 
27. Id. at 30. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–189, § 17, 116 Stat. 
698, 706 (2002) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635); see also 148 CONG. REC. H1771, at H1786 
(daily ed. May 1, 2002) (statement of Rep. J.C. Watts) (“[W]e must reach out to developing na-
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ternational Development (USAID), with a history of fighting poverty 
long before September 11, now aims to have “a major role in minimiz-
ing the conditions that foster terrorism, instability, and other global 
threats,” according to Deputy Assistant Administrator Gordon West.32 
The United States National Security Strategy targets global economic 
development as a key factor in enhancing national security,33 drawing an 
explicit link between development and threat reduction.34 
The National Security Strategy was implemented after a historic con-
ference in Monterrey, Mexico. Six months after September 11, 2001, in 
Monterrey, Mexico, at the United Nations Conference on Financing for 
Development, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private businesses reaf-
firmed the need to encourage private capital flows to poor countries in 
order to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals, which in-
cludes the resolution “[t]o halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the 
world’s people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the pro-
portion of people who suffer from hunger….”35 Part of the Monterrey 
Consensus is that “[u]nderdevelopment and extreme poverty are breed-
ing grounds for violence and despair, thus undermining peace and secu-
rity for developed and developing countries alike.”36 Consequently, 
President Bush pledged to raise American official development assis-
tance progressively from 10 to 15 billion dollars, with assistance tied to 
the recipients’ anti-terrorism record37 and with the establishment of a 
new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).38 The MCA not only pro-
                                                                                                                                      
tions across the globe, often beset by forces of terror, and demonstrate how free markets, open 
trade, and private enterprise under the rule of law can lead to prosperity for their citizens. Our 
national security improves when global stability prevails.”). 
32. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, USAID STRIVES TO MINIMIZE CONDITIONS THAT FOSTER 
TERRORISM (2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archieve/2004/Jan/06-495201.html. 
33. Id. 
34. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, iv-vi (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
35. Jens Martens, Global Development Cooperation After Monterrey, Results and Perspec-
tives from the Financing for Development Process, at 1, 4, 7, available at http://www2 
.weed-online.org/ffd/doc/martens-monterrey-results.rtf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). 
36. International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., Mar. 18–20, 
2002, Report of the International Conference on Financing For Development, 82, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.198/11 (Mar. 22, 2002) (statement of Han Seung-soo, President of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations). 
37. Martens, supra note 35, at 6–7. 
38. Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 156–57 (2004). On January 23, 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corpo-
ration (MCC) was signed into law. The MCC will administer the MCA. Initial funding for the 
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motes the standard objectives favored by traditional development pro-
jects but also conditions financial disbursement on the recipient’s im-
plementation of certain prerequisites.39 
The United States is also promoting a trade agenda that is part of its 
overall strategy for combating terrorism. In the immediate post-
September 11 environment, then U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zo-
ellick described the Bush Administration’s trade agenda as one integral 
to the country’s counteroffensive against terrorism. “Trade is about 
more than economic efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of 
this protracted struggle.”40 The United States, for example, is pushing to 
develop a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013.41 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, law and develop-
ment has been resurrected and transformed from an important, but sec-
ond-tier-level project to a critical component of the United States’ long-
term anti-terrorism, national security strategy.42 Fighting terrorism now 
includes at the forefront a focus on market and rule of law reform ef-
forts long proposed by standard development scholars.43 What is still 
missing is a concerted effort to address the cultural foundations without 
which markets and rule of law projects are likely to fail. 
B. Development as Human Rights 
Law and development remains a priority for traditional development 
organizations such as the World Bank, as secure property and contract 
rights are deemed necessary for the development of a robust, rule-bound 
                                                                                                                                      
2004 fiscal year is $1 billion. Millennium Challenge Corp., MCC Accomplishments at Three, 
http://www.mcc.gov/features/mccatthree/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); see also Editorial, 
The President’s Millennium Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at 32 (hailing the MCA as “a 
new approach to development aid that links American assistance to a poor country to its progress 
in key areas”). 
39. The MCC administers the MCA. Its board determines eligible countries, relying on six-
teen indicators grouped into three categories. Under category one, “Ruling Justly,” the indicators 
include “civil liberties,” “rule of law,” and “control of corruption.” Under category two, “Encour-
aging Economic Freedom,” the indicators include “country credit rating,” “fiscal policy,” “trade 
policy,” and “days to start a business.” Id. Under category three, “Investing in People,” indicators 
include “public expenditures on health as percent of GDP,” “public primary education as percent 
of GDP,” and “immunization rates.” Millennium Challenge Corp., REPORT ON THE CRITERIA 
AND METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR 
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT ASSISTANCE IN FY 2004, available at http://www.mcc.gov/ 
selection/reports/FY04_Criteria_Methodology.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). 
40. Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror with Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35. 
41. Fandl, supra note 23, at 622; Lindsey, supra note 25, at 1. 
42. See Thomas Carothers, The New Aid, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2002, at A19. 
43. See generally id. 
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market.44 Even charitable NGOs such as Oxfam, which may disagree 
about the appropriate strategies for market development and reforms, 
generally acknowledge that a working market (and the rule of law nec-
essary to support it) is imperative for poverty reduction.45 The UN, 
which has traditionally been statist in orientation and suspicious of 
global markets, now recognizes the need to engage the market and pro-
mote trade, through greater coordination with the WTO46 and the inter-
national business community.47 As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
remarked: 
A fundamental shift has occurred in the UN-business relation-
ship. The United Nations has developed a profound appreciation 
for the role of the private sector, its expertise, its motivated spirit, 
its unparalleled ability to create jobs and wealth…. In a world of 
common challenges and common vulnerabilities, the United Na-
tions and business are finding common ground.48 
 
44. See Hewko, supra note 18, at 3; Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN 
AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 95, 97 (“Basic elements of a modern market economy such as property 
rights and contracts are founded on the law and require competent third-party enforcement. With-
out the rule of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and labor unions 
would not function, and the government’s many involvements in the economy—regulatory 
mechanisms, tax systems, customs structures, monetary policy, and the like—would be unfair, 
inefficient, and opaque.”); Carothers, supra at 98 (“[E]conomic globalization is feeding the rule-
of-law imperative by putting pressure on governments to offer the stability, transparency, and 
accountability that international investors demand.”). 
45. See OXFAM, A CASE FOR REFORM: FIFTY YEARS OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK 2 
(1995).  
There is today a growing consensus that markets have a critical role to play in develop-
ment, and that chronic budget deficits and balance of payments deficits must be ad-
dressed. It is also recognized that, in the creation of the crisis of the 1980s, the impact of 
external forces was compounded by internal factors, such as ill-conceived forms of State 
intervention. 
Id. 
46. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, approved by the largest gathering of states 
since the UN’s founding, aims for “greater policy coherence and better cooperation between the 
United Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization, 
as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully coordinated approach to the 
problems of peace and development.” United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, at 
9, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/L.2 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
47. At the 1999 World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, Secretary Annan prom-
ised that the United Nations would “make the case for and maintain an environment which favors 
trade and open markets.” Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes, Labor Standards and Global Gov-
ernance: Examining the Dimensions of Institutional Engagement, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259, 
266 (2000) (quoting Press Release, The Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global 
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in 
Davos, U.N. Press Release No. SG/SM/6881/Rev.1 (Feb. 1, 1999)). 
48. Kofi Annan, Message to the Business Humanitarian Forum (Jan. 27, 1999), 
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Those enthusiastic about markets and the rule of law are now numer-
ous and include entities that do not ordinarily form part of a common 
alliance, such as development NGOs, businesses, human rights groups, 
and the UN. This is partly because there is credible evidence to support 
the notion that countries that have achieved a certain level of wealth—
an objective of development—are likely to have a good human rights 
record as well. For example, an empirical study focusing on twelve 
Asian countries shows that although there is wide variation among them 
with respect to human rights and quality of life indicators, such as infant 
mortality, life expectancy, expenditures on education and health, what is 
most important in explaining differences in rights observance and qual-
ity of life is wealth.49 As the author of the study concluded, “In the sub-
tle and complex interplay of economics, politics, culture, law and insti-
tutions in determining rights performance, what matters most is wealth. 
Put bluntly, if somewhat too simply, if you want better performance 
across a range of rights and indicators of human wellbeing, show me the 
money.”50 This finding that wealth, one measure of economic develop-
ment,51 correlates with an improvement in the protection of rights, 
whether political or economic, has been duplicated and supported by 
many other studies.52 
A UN report shows that there is also a positive relationship between 
wealth and women’s rights as measured by the UN Gender Develop-
ment Index, which correlates almost perfectly with the Human Devel-
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.bhforum.ch/default.aspx?frame=/documentation/message_from_un_secretary_general
.htm. 
49. Randall Peerenboom, Show Me the Money: The Dominance of Wealth in Determining 
Rights Performance in Asia, 15 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 75 (2004). 
50. Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
51. Economic growth is not nor should it be the sole determinant of economic development. 
One approach to development is to view it as  
a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy…. Viewing development in 
terms of expanding substantive freedoms directs attention to the ends that make devel-
opment important, rather than merely to some of the means (for example, growth of the 
GNP) that, inter alia, play a prominent part in the process. 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (Oxford 1999).  
52. See, e.g., GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, 
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 248, 251–53 (2d ed. 2001) 
(finding that wealth mattered the most in terms of rights compliance); William H. Meyer, Human 
Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 368, 393–94 (1996) 
(showing that GNP is the biggest factor in countries’ observation of political, civil, social, and 
economic rights); UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END POVERTY (2003), 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_complete.pdf.  
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opment Index (HDI).53 Other studies have corroborated this result, 
showing that a higher GDP is positively correlated with better observa-
tion of women’s rights.54 Moreover, a country’s economic development 
correlates not only with rights observation but also with democracy. 
Theorists who have studied the conditions necessary for democracy to 
take root have noted a strong correlation between economic develop-
ment and democracy,55 with the latter, in turn, providing more rights 
protection than non-democracies.56 In fact, one could credibly argue that 
economic development, in the long run, translates into better protection 
for human rights than other indicators, such as ratification by states of 
human rights treaties.57 
 
53. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, UNDP GENDER-RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDEX 
(2003), http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/pdf/hdr05_table_25.pdf. The HDI is a summary meas-
ure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic di-
mensions of human development: First, a “long and healthy life,” as measured by life expectancy 
at birth; second, “knowledge,” as measured by the adult literacy rate (which accounts for two-
thirds of the score) and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratio (ac-
counting for one-third of the score); and finally, a “decent” standard of living, as measured by 
GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2006, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY, AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 263 
(2006), http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf. 
54. Clair Apodaca, Measuring Women’s Economic and Social Rights Achievement, 20 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 139, 160 (1998). 
55. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset noted that the most important variable that corre-
lated with democracy was a basic level of economic development. See Seymour Martin Lipset, 
The Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 69, 75 (1959). Lipset observed that the usual indices of economic development—
average wealth, degree of industrialization, education level—were higher in democratic countries 
than non-democratic countries. Id. at 75–79. Others have noted that once democratization occurs, 
it tends to survive in countries that have attained a certain minimum level of economic develop-
ment, Adam Prezworksi & F. Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49 WORLD POLITICS 
155, 165 (1997), or at least that once a more economically developed country democratizes, it is 
more improbable that it will revert to authoritarianism. See Barbara Geddes, What Do We Know 
About Democratization After Twenty Years?, 2 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 117–19 (1999); Peeren-
boom, supra note 49, at 100 (“Whether or not economic development is the cause of democratiza-
tion, in the long term, economically advanced countries are likely to be, and to remain, democra-
cies.”).  
56. Sen has observed that “no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a 
functioning democracy—be it economically rich (as in contemporary Western Europe or North 
America) or relatively poor (as in postindependence India, or Botswana, or Zimbabwe).” SEN, 
supra note 51, at 16.  
57. See Linda C. Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE. RES. 95, 112 (1999) 
(finding in a study of 178 countries from 1976 to 1998 that signing the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and even the Optional Protocol allowing individuals the right to initiate 
complaints against a state did not cause the ratifying countries to alter their actual behavior, such 
as to improve their human rights record); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941, 1978 (2002) (finding in a study of 166 countries that 
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It is widely acknowledged that despite billions of dollars in aid spent 
over the years, law and development has been characterized by more 
failure than success.58 Considerable time and effort have been expended 
in establishing a formal framework, focusing, for example, on issues re-
lated to the formal economy and the writing and enactment of formal 
laws necessary to support it. Thus the “law” in “law and development” 
has meant formal laws. The “development” in “law and development” 
has meant, for the most part, the development of a functioning formal 
economy. As observed by Tom Carothers, founder and co-director of the 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for In-
ternational Peace, the “Rule of Law Assistance Standard Menu,” as he 
coined it, includes “reforming institutions” such as reform of the judici-
ary, the legislatures, the police and prison system, “rewriting laws,” in-
cluding modernization of criminal and commercial laws, “upgrading the 
legal profession through support for stronger bar associations and law 
schools,” and “increasing legal access and advocacy.”59 The focus is 
clearly on formal institutions and statutes.60 
Simply speaking, these projects have not been enough but yet are re-
peated.61 There are several reasons why the current standard menu of-
                                                                                                                                      
states ratifying human rights treaties have only a slightly better compliance record than non-
ratifying countries, and that countries with the worst human rights records have higher rates of 
ratification than countries with a better record).  
58. See Carothers, supra note 44, at 96; Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Ju-
dicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working Pa-
per No. 28, 2002) (finding that efforts to free the judicial system in many Latin American coun-
tries of nepotism and corruption have failed) available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 
files/wp28.pdf; Holmes, supra note 18, at 1 (“[Despite] a multimillion-dollar effort to promote 
the ‘rule of law’ in the Russian Federation…[w]hat we have in Russia today, in short, is an inco-
herent state tenuously connected to a demoralized society. This pattern explains why there is little 
of the rule of law, despite foreign efforts to promote it, and why the problems facing legal-
development programs seem so immense and intractable.”). 
59. THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 165–168 
(Carnegie Endowment 1999). 
60. Carothers, supra note 44, at 99. Law and development assistance for the Russian Federa-
tion, for example, has a similar focus. Projects “include everything from study visits and continu-
ing-education programs for judges to the coaching of court administrators in docket management 
and the establishment of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms.” Holmes, supra note 18, at 1. 
Others focus on “legal codification [and] the modernization of legal information systems…, [par-
ticularly] legislative drafting assistance in commercial-law areas, such as securities, bankruptcy, 
corporate governance, and banking.” Id. 
61. In evaluating judicial reform efforts, Tom Carothers has observed that aid advisors “seem 
determined to repeat mistakes made in other places.” CAROTHERS, supra note 59, at 176; 
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRUMPS IN THE WEST AND 
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 12 (2000) (“Since the nineteenth century, nations have been copying 
the laws of the West to give their citizens the institutional framework to produce wealth. They 
continue to copy such laws today, and obviously it doesn’t work.”).  
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fered by law and development assistance is off the mark. First, although 
this formalistic approach emphasizing rule of law and market develop-
ment is necessary, it is far from sufficient. Much more attention needs to 
be paid to the non-law framework, norms,62 and culture that influence 
the efficacy of formal laws. Second, the majority of the poor in develop-
ing countries live in a parallel, “extralegal” universe defined by infor-
mality.63 A call by the noted Peruvian economist, Hernando De Soto, to 
address the informal sector—in brief, to discover “their informal norms 
and arrangements” and “find ways to integrate them into the formal 
property system”64—has already been proposed and I will not discuss it 
here. Suffice it to say that De Soto does not place high hopes on the 
drafting of new laws—often imposed by governments with the help of 
foreign experts.65 As he puts it, “if lawyers want to play a role in creat-
ing good laws, they must step out of their law libraries into the extrale-
gal sector….”66 Whether one agrees with De Soto’s recommendation to 
study and formalize informal arrangements67 for the purpose of my Ar-
ticle, what is important is the fact that he goes beyond the usual law and 
development emphasis on formal laws and rules to include the norms 
and custom of the informal economic sector. 
I would go further still. In Part II below, I examine the glaring gap in 
law and development studies—a blind spot to culture, norms, and cus-
tom and how they influence a country’s laws and its economic devel-
opment. The gap may be derived from an acultural framework law and 
development inherited from international law generally; or from a gen-
eral reluctance to touch culture because of a history of cultural imperial-
ism and current sensitivities associated with it; or from the sense that 
culture is hard to quantify and thus cannot be legislated into being the 
ways laws and rules can. 
 
62. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and the “Rule of Law”, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003). 
63. Hernando De Soto defines an extralegal system as one where many of the world’s poor 
live and work—“outside the official law, using their own informally binding arrangements to pro-
tect and mobilize their assets.” DE SOTO, supra note 61, at 21. 
64. Id. at 179. 
65. Often, foreign development experts believe they’ve achieved great success if “their advice 
is swallowed whole and the laws they draft are actually passed by parliament.” Holmes, supra 
note 18, at 7. Yet this is often the case if the country at issue is one where formal laws are virtu-
ally unenforced. 
66. DE SOTO, supra note 61, at 186–87. 
67. For a critique of De Soto’s ideas, see for example Jonathan Manders, Sequencing Prop-
erty Rights in the Context of Development: A Critique of the Writings of Hernando De Soto, 37 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 177 (2004).  
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II. CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The term “culture” carries many meanings and has been subjected to 
many definitions.68 As I am not an anthropologist, I use the term 
loosely, so that a community’s culture means simply the “beliefs, pref-
erences, and behaviors of its members, along with the mechanisms that 
link these traits to one another.”69 Culture may be used in this sense “to 
summarize the way in which groups distinguish themselves from other 
groups”70 through “shared histories, traditions, values, and beliefs.”71 
For the most part, international law, international relations, and law 
and development have neglected to address culture.72 Some have sug-
gested that international relations’ acultural stance may have to do with 
the perception that culture is too imprecise a concept for analysis.73 This 
bias against culture is compounded by international relations’ view of 
itself as an empirical science grounded in facts, not values,74 and its 
roots in the positivist tradition.75 Furthermore, the discipline adopts a 
theoretical model that presents theories as being universally applicable 
 
68. Two influential anthropologists have documented more than 161 formal definitions of 
culture. ALFRED LOUIS KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOLN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS (1952). See also ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE 
ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT 56 (1999), for select definitions: for example, “the total way of 
life of a people”; “the social legacy the individual acquires from his group”; “a storehouse of 
pooled learning”; “a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems”; “a mechanism for the 
normative regulation of behavior.”  
69. Kuran, supra note 4, at 115, 117. One could call this a “thin” conception of culture—
encompassing only “subjective terms as the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying 
assumptions prevalent among people in a society.” Samuel P. Huntington, Foreword: Cultures 
Count, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at xv. By contrast, the noted anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz, it has been said, subscribes to a “thick description” of culture, using it “to refer to the en-
tire way of life of a society: its values, practices, symbols, institutions, and human relationships.” 
Id. 
70. Jacinta O’Hagan, Re-framing International Law for the 21st Century: Conflict, Conver-
gence or Co-existence? The Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 537, 538 (1999). 
71. Id. at 539. Despite the ethnic and religious differences among European countries, one 
might observe that “[t]he expansion of the West, as a civilization, has been one of the most sig-
nificant features of this millennium.” Id. at 541. 
72. See infra notes 73–91 and accompanying text. 
73. Philip Darby & Albert Paolini, Bridging International Relations and Post-Colonialism, 19 
ALTERNATIVES 371, 382 (1994); R.B.J. Walker, The Concept of Culture in the Theory of Interna-
tional Relations, in CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 7–8 (Jongsuk Chay ed., 1990).  
74. HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE 3 (3d ed. 1964); see also Stanley Hoffmann, An American Social Science: International 
Relations, 106 DAEDALUS 41 (1977).  
75. Robert Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379 
(1988); Dominique Jacquin et al., Culture in International Relations: An Introduction to the Spe-
cial Issue, 22 MILLENNIUM 375, 375 (1993). 
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and proposes rules that are to be universally appropriate, transcending 
local or cultural differences.76 For example, states are presumed to act in 
a certain culture-neutral way while in pursuit of power and security.77 
International law too tends to insist that its rules are universally valid, 
in other words, “that a body of doctrine, a common history, a common 
cosmopolitan ‘college’ of international legal colleagues, a common lan-
guage, bind international lawyers to one another across different na-
tional cultures or legal traditions….”78 Indeed, international law, 
whether “public” or “private,”79 generally aims for universality, not dif-
ference—and a focus on culture usually tends to highlight differences80 
that are problematic to the objective of the discipline—“to empower an 
international public order above the nation, an international private or-
der below or outside the state, or a complex regime of transnational or-
der.”81 
 
76. Robert Cox, Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations The-
ory, 10 MILLENNIUM 126, 132 (1981); Richard Ashley, The Poverty of Neo-Realism, 38 INT’L 
ORG. 225, 286 (1984); Barry Buzan, The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?, in INTERNATIONAL 
THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND (Smith et al. eds., 1996). 
77. KENNETH WALTZ, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 80 (1979). For the view 
that international relations is not culture neutral but instead rooted in Western culture, see Richard 
Falk, Culture, Modernism, Postmodernism: A Challenge to International Relations, in CULTURE 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 267, 268 (Jongsuk Chay ed., 1990); David Kennedy, The Dis-
ciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9, 118 (1999) (“The insistence on 
the universality of international law often denied the roots of international law in Western pro-
jects of conquest and understated the obvious density of legal and political relations within cul-
tural, economic, or ideological blocs.”).  
78. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 17.  
79. For a critique bemoaning the false dichotomy between “public” and “private” interna-
tional law, see Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic Development, 32 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 209, 222–33 (1997).  
80. In contrast to international law, for example, comparative law specializes in differences. 
81. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 62. Internationalists ignore culture also because it “may break 
the internationalist frame in two related ways: by generating solidarities which cross the neat 
boundaries of nation-states or by empowering smaller entities within states to erupt into interna-
tional consciousness.” Id. at 63. For a discussion of international law’s marginalization of culture, 
see id. at 62–69, 66 (describing how international law’s approach to dealing with culture is “to 
render cultural differences internal to the sovereign form, outside the arena of international gov-
ernance, as local matters of politics or culture”); id. at 85 (“governance is international while cul-
ture is local”); id at 86 (“service of the disciplinary desire carries with it an erasure of particularist 
projects, sands them down, harnesses them to a universal project”); id. at 98 (international law 
considers itself a cosmopolitan project, “more universal, rational, pragmatic, and expert than what 
goes on nationally or locally. Brussels is better than Bonn and Bonn is better than Bremen. The 
International Monetary Fund is better than the Russian Central Bank as that Bank is better than 
the government budgetary process in Uzbekistan…. [T]he international is agnostic about how one 
conducts oneself at home—international law bridges between states by providing a space above 
cultural differences.”); id. at 126 (for international law, “culture [is] a set of local or particularist 
commitments, a different language altogether from the communicative methods of cosmopolitan 
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Public international law is statist in orientation82 and prefers to deal 
with states, governments, and other sovereignty-related issues, relegat-
ing culture to the side.83 Private international law, or international eco-
nomic law,84 deals with nonstate—specifically market—actors and aims 
to protect normal market activities from the irrationality of culture.85 
Private international law has aimed to construct an international liberal 
regime of WTO rules to transcend the prejudices of the local.86 Indeed, 
the often vehement opposition to globalization87 may be understood in 
part as a reaction against the universalist claims of internationalism and 
a defense of local cultures.88 Opposition to private international law and 
                                                                                                                                      
governance”); id. at 127 (“[C]osmopolitanism…needs to be defended against outbreaks of more 
primitive sensibilities when those sensibilities challenge the possibility of a universal pragmatism, 
and to be more tolerant of diverse cultural differences when they do not threaten that hegem-
ony…. Where this line should be drawn remains…a matter of controversy, but the frame is stable: 
culture can be managed by exclusion or assimilation.”); id. at 127 (international “cosmopolitan-
ism is not itself a culture, but comes after culture, emerges from the defeat of the particularism of 
culture, and must be ‘tolerant’ of cultural differences…, precisely to retain distance from the cul-
tural”).  
82. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 44 (“Whatever its various qualifications, public international 
law still begins with sovereign states…. The job of public international law is to bring governance 
to sovereign….”). 
83. See supra notes 72–82. 
84. As used in the United States, “private international law” is concerned with international 
business transactions and related commercial and trade matters. Joel Richard Paul, The Isolation 
of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 149, 151 n.4; Kennedy, supra note 77, at 38–39. 
85. See, e.g., Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 2, 80 (2000) (“The whole legal structure of the free trade norm rests on a rational economic 
model…. Cultural claims threaten that rationality argument.”). 
86. Commentators have described the rise of international economic arbitration as the attempt 
by private international law to develop “in appropriate cases, a jus gentium or lex mercatoria of a 
new type, free of the contingencies and prejudices which dominate the scene in the various 
States.” RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985). “[W]hen parties re-
quest that arbitrators adjudicate their dispute in accordance with international law or with the 
general principles of law, their intention is to escape from the national systems of law.” Id. at 
350–51. 
For example, Article 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) “creates a 
binding, supranational arbitration scheme accessible directly by private business parties through 
which businesses may overturn final anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions of domestic 
trade regulators.” G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An 
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 887 (1995). Similarly, the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, creates a system where domestic courts of signatory countries are bound, subject only to a 
minimal “public policy” exception, to enforce arbitration decisions rendered by private interna-
tional commercial arbitrators. 
87. I have elsewhere characterized globalization as a “hyper state of internationalization.” 
Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S. Trade 
Laws,,90 CAL. L. REV. 402, 415 (2002). 
88. Nationalists opposed to the universalist and homogenizing inclinations of international 
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to what critics view as its agenda—globalization of markets—has been 
increasingly staked on cultural grounds.89 Private international law, 
however, continues to maintain an international economic system 
oblivious to cultural particularities.90 
However, in recent years, culture has been injected into the national 
and international mainstream due to certain political and intellectual de-
velopments. The end of the Cold War meant a surge in identity politics91 
both at the subnational and transnational level.92 An intellectual interest 
in identity and culture issues has accompanied this political shift as 
well, with some scholars seeing a cultural world order of increased co-
hesion within and clashes among civilizational groups93 and with others 
anticipating modernization and convergence along a Western, liberal 
model.94 
                                                                                                                                      
law stake their claims on national and local projects that speak the people’s language: “the emo-
tionalism, the vulgar populism, the highly-colored romanticism of most national ideology (all the 
things intellectuals have always held their noses at.).” TOM NAIRN, THE BREAK-UP OF BRITAIN 
354 (2d exp. ed. 1977). 
89. See Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Democracy Should Not Have Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 589, 592 (2000) (describing economic internationalism as being devoid of “any concep-
tion of a world beyond the market—the political or civic or cultural world in which ideas, beliefs, 
traditions, even innovations have meaning beyond their salability”); Robert Wolf, The Regionalist 
Answer, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 610, 621 (2000) (describing “globalization of world trade and 
culture [as] a process of homogenization which an increasing number of people perceive as soul-
less and dehumanizing” and decrying “world-wide monoculture now being created by the corpo-
rations”).  
90. See generally Paul, supra note 85, at 2 (discussing efforts to seek cultural exceptions to 
free trade rules—for example, Europe’s call for exemption from trade rules prohibiting barriers to 
the importation of American films, music, and television because American culture may over-
whelm local European cultures; such claims are generally rejected). 
91. Culture is necessarily implicated in identity politics. There are many definitions of cul-
ture, see supra note 68. One definition focuses on identity: “[c]ulture is concerned with identity, 
aspiration, symbolic exchange, coordination, and structures and practices that serve relational 
ends, such as ethnicity ritual, heritage, norms, meanings, and beliefs.” Vijayendra Rao & Michael 
Walton, Culture and Public Action: Relationality, Equality of Agency, and Development, in 
CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 4. Kennedy, supra note 77, at 111 (referring to 
the end of the Cold War as unleashing “outbreaks of primitive or pre-ideological cultural passions 
frozen by the Cold War”). 
92. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and 
Practice, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 362 (1996) (“The term nation or tribe suggests an affinity group 
that has placed certain values high on its agenda: shared genealogical origins, language and his-
toric myths, as well as cultural and, perhaps, religious compatibility.”).  
93. Huntington, supra note 69. In a similar vein, in contemporary, post-Cold War world poli-
tics, a heightened sense of cultural awareness and identity has resulted in ethnic turbulence in 
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Chechnya, expressed not just in terms of national ethnic identity (Kosovar, 
Bosnian, Chechnyan), but also civilizational identity (Slavic, Orthodox, Islamic). O’Hagan, supra 
note 70, at 553, 560. 
94. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN iv, xv, 77 (1992) (“All 
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Generally speaking, however, international law remains ambivalent 
about engaging culture directly despite the recent surge in identity poli-
tics. There are at least two reasons for this continued ambivalence. First, 
while nationalism is associated with particularism, such as language, 
ethnicity, religion, or culture,95 internationalism disassociates itself from 
“particularism and parochialism” and is instead allied with “universal-
ism and cosmopolitan sophistication.”96 When faced with particularistic 
claims, international law has sought to develop a framework to harness 
or contain them, for example, by recognizing the right of a “people” to 
self-determination and by implication their own nation-state,97 or the 
right of a culture to self-determination and by implication to be left 
alone within their own self-defined borders. International law, in other 
words, sidesteps cultural issues and, having endowed culture with the 
right to self-determination, abstains from any claim to engage with or 
influence its development within any defined community. 
Second, international law has for years been in the strange position of 
having to defend itself as worthy of being considered “real law,”98 wres-
tling with the perpetual question of “is international law, law,”99 and 
thus is interested, even if claiming not to be, in proving to other disci-
plines that it too has all the usual attributes of law. Although interna-
tional lawyers have emphasized that centralized enforcement is not es-
                                                                                                                                      
countries undergoing economic modernization must increasingly resemble one another,” as such 
changes wrought by modernization “blur the boundaries between civilizations and promote a ho-
mogeneous set of political and economic institutions among the world’s most advanced coun-
tries.”) Id. at xv; see also Michael Mazarr, Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay, 
19 WASH. Q., Spring 1996, at 177, 178 (discussing how cultural clashes are part of the transition 
undergone by countries moving from one stage of economic development to another).  
95. Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 7, 10 
(1995). 
96. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Nationalism Versus Internationalism: Another Look, 26 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 585, 585 (1994). See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.  
97. Cao, supra note 87, at 411–12 n.32.  
98. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that interna-
tional law is not real law because of the absence of a “unifying rule of recognition” and “secon-
dary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislatures and courts…”).  
99. See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the 
TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 837 n.43 (2003) (“The organizing inquiry of 
international law is ‘is international law law?’”); Ruti Teitel, The Future of Human Rights Dis-
course, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 449, 459 n.47 (2002) (addressing the positive/natural law debate in 
international law, “namely framing the question: to what extent is international law, law?”). The 
question endures because critics are not convinced that international law, without strong enforce-
ment mechanisms, can qualify as law. International lawyers have thus spent considerable time 
and energy defending the field. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND 
FOREIGN POLICY 13–27 (2d ed. 1979); J.L. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 
(1944).  
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sential to a determination of whether something is or is not law, pointing 
to international law’s compliance features instead,100 they have also 
worked to make international law more like domestic law by strengthen-
ing international law’s enforcement features.101 In that respect, interna-
tional law has shored up its positive law aspects and neglected to con-
sider seriously the “soft” law attributes of the discipline—norms and 
custom (the ingredients of culture in the sense used in this Article)—
even while, ironically, scholars in the domestic law area are increasingly 
exploring their significance.102 
Similarly, culture remains a non-issue in law and development, as the 
discipline is intransigently law-centered.103 My critique of the tradition 
of law and development follows in Part III. 
III. LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. A Cautionary Tale 
At the risk of overgeneralizing, most law and development scholars 
come from an international law tradition that is, in the United States at 
least, part of a liberal framework of cosmopolitanism.104 Unlike the na-
tionalist whose primary identification is with his or her nation, the cos-
mopolitan’s “allegiance is to the worldwide community of human be-
 
100. Lori F. Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269 
REC. DES COURS 9, 19–24 (1997) (discussing how international law is in fact enforced in differ-
ent ways); Detlev F. Vagts, United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 313, 323–29 (exploring five possible grounds for compliance by countries of their treaty 
obligations).  
101. The desire to be more like domestic law has meant crafting strong enforcement mecha-
nisms, such as creating ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the International Criminal Courts, 
and the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization.  
102. I have elsewhere written about the powerful impact community norms play in facilitat-
ing the production of social capital and the conversion of such social capital into economic capi-
tal. See Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, supra note 1. For a discussion of norms and 
their interaction with law, see id. at 864–74.  
103. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 2071 (describing the core attributes of legal 
liberalism in highly law-centered ways). 
104. See Kennedy, supra note 77, at 23 (“International law in the United States after 1945 
provided a congenial intellectual home for a large number of immigrants, among them European 
and Jewish refugees, whose American patriotism was cosmopolitan rather than jingoistic and who 
have been among the field’s strongest intellectual leaders.”); id. at 11 (“Legal internationalists in 
the United States for most of the last 50 years have linked their status to the reputational ups and 
downs of a broadly liberal cosmopolitanism….”); Slaughter Burley, supra note 96, at 585; see 
also supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
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ings.”105 The cosmopolitan tends to  
hold to a vision that accepts, even celebrates, the diversity of so-
cial and political systems in the world, taking pleasure in the ex-
istence and the products of peoples and places other than our 
own homes. Thus, what is distinctive about cosmopolitans is that 
we display our concern for our fellow humans without demand-
ing of them that they become like ourselves.106 
Law and development scholars steeped in the international cosmopoli-
tan tradition are passionate about alleviating poverty in poor countries 
but reluctant to tinker with or condemn norms or cultural attributes that 
impede economic progress. 
After Vietnam, as skepticism about American power and motives 
rose, so did “loss of faith in liberal legalism as a picture of United States 
society” or “doubts about the universality or desirability of the Ameri-
can experience.”107 Indeed, law and development scholars became vocal 
in their charges that the movement was ethnocentric and naïve,108 and as 
some adopted the perspective of the critical legal studies movement 
(CLS), denounced the liberal legal paradigm they had favored as “in-
herently problematic.”109 
Thus, there are two strands in law and development: first, an interna-
tional cosmopolitanism that celebrates cultural diversity and loathes to 
criticize or be perceived as criticizing any particular culture, and second, 
a CLS inclination that is both appropriately critical of the failed prom-
ises of the liberal law and development model and also devoid of practi-
cal alternatives. Add to this mix an awareness among these scholars of 
colonial history and the concomitant Orientalist tradition of defining the 
colonizing West as the privileged “self” against which the colonized 
Orient (or Third World), the “other,” is to be contrasted against and im-
proved upon.110 
 
105. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY 4 
(Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).  
106. Kwame Anthony Appiah, The University in an Age of Globalization, Lecture at the 
Princeton-Oxford Conference on Globalization at Oxford University (June 2002), quoted in 
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, The International Dimension of the Law School Curriculum, 22 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 417, 419 n.4 (2004). 
107. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 10, at 1089. 
108. Id. at 1080. 
109. Id. at 1099. For a critique of this shift in law and development, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, 
Law and Development, 898 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 474–75 (1995). 
110. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978); see also Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and 
Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 210 (2001) (describing the 
“impulse to universalize Eurocentric norms and values by repudiating, demonizing, and ‘other-
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For the West, the Orient, according to the noted scholar Edward Said, 
is not a geography but a European creation and Orientalism the “enor-
mously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to 
manage, even produce, the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, 
ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-
Enlightenment period.”111 Notable Western scholars have engaged in 
Orientalism, suggesting, for example, that the Orient (and its equivalent) 
is frozen in time and incapable of progress or change,112 whereas by im-
plication the West is dynamic and progressive. For change to occur, the 
impetus must come from Europe, even if via the shock of colonial en-
counter.113 Similar denunciations include the charge that the “Orient” 
(China in particular) is incomprehensible (or inscrutable),114 illogical 
                                                                                                                                      
ing’ that which is different and non-European”). Note that Orientalism is not limited to the “Ori-
ent” but extends to other locales as well. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: 
POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 27 (2000) (“‘Europe’ remains the sov-
ereign, theoretical subject of all histories, including the ones we call ‘Indian,’ ‘Chinese,’ ‘Ken-
yan,’ and so on.”).  
111. SAID, supra note 110, at 3. Note that although the United States usually equates East 
Asia (China, Japan, for example) with the “Orient,” Said’s use of the word “Orient” is derived 
from a European understanding of the word and thus focuses on the Middle East. 
112. Hegel, for example, declared that:  
Early do we see China advancing to the condition in which it is found at this day, for as 
the contrast between objective existence and subjective freedom of movement within it, 
is still wanting, every change is excluded, and the fixedness of character which recurs 
perpetually takes the place of what we should call the truly historical. 
GEORG WILHELM HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 116 (J. Sibree trans., Dover 1956). We-
ber too wrote that “Chinese intellectual life remained completely static, and despite seemingly 
favorable conditions modern capitalism simply did not appear.” MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF 
CHINA 55 (Hans H. Gerth trans., Free Press 1951). Marx made a similar observation about China: 
Its “isolation having come to a violent end by the medium of England, dissolution must follow as 
surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is 
brought into contact with the open air.” KARL MARX, MARX ON CHINA, 1853–1860: ARTICLES 
FROM THE NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE 4 (Dona Torr ed., 1951). Maine also described “the East” 
as static: in “those great and unexplored regions which we vaguely term the East…the distinction 
between the Present and the Past disappears.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 
IN THE EAST AND WEST 7 (John Murray, 2d ed. 1872). Nietzsche described China as a “country 
in which large-scale dissatisfaction and the capacity for change have become extinct centuries 
ago.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 99 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Random House 
1974) (1887); see also Edward H. Parker, The Principles of Chinese Law and Equity, 22 L.Q. 
REV. 190, 209 (1906) (stating that China is nothing more than a “monotonous history”). 
113. Karl Marx, The Future Results of British Rule in India, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 
659 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978) (describing the two functions of colonial rule, “one destructive, 
the other generating, the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the lying of the material founda-
tions of Western society in Asia”). 
114. Foucault wrote the following of China: “at the other extremity of the earth we inhabit, a 
culture devoted entirely to the ordering of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity 
of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and 
think.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, at xix (1993). Hegel described China as “a 
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and developmentally stunted,115 with “laws”116 that are equally static 
and unchangeable.117 Assuming modernization is even possible under 
those circumstances, it would have to culminate in a Europeanized 
one.118 
Given the awareness among most law and development scholars of 
this history, it is no wonder that many are uncomfortable with the pro-
ject they have embarked upon as privileged subjects, often Western-
educated experts, working to develop or modernize the object of their 
project, the primitive Third World. Indeed, there may very well be a 
whiff of Orientalism in the very objectives and assumptions of law and 
development itself. Referring to China specifically, although his obser-
vations are equally applicable to other developing countries, the histo-
rian Paul Cohen noted that there is a tendency for the West to play 
“Beauty to China’s Beast, transforming by its kiss the torpor of centu-
ries, releasing with its magical power the potential for ‘development’ 
that must otherwise remain forever locked up.”119 
My proposal to go beyond law and modernizing law to culture and 
culture change will undoubtedly smack some of Orientalism. If even le-
gal liberalism—instituting laws to support a liberal market society—
may be suspect for some law and development scholars, then certainly 
“cultural liberalism” promoting cultural attributes that would facilitate 
the establishment of a liberal market society would be as well, or even 
more so.120 
Indeed, until recently, even in disciplines other than international re-
lations and international law, culture is irrelevant or marginalized: it can 
                                                                                                                                      
dull half-conscious brooding spirit.” HEGEL, supra note 112, at 142. 
115. WEBER, supra note 112, at 125 (charging that the Chinese writing system, by ideo-
graphic or pictorial representation, has led to unfortunate results: “The power of logos, of defin-
ing and reasoning, has not been accessible to the Chinese,” so that “[t]he very concept of logic 
[has] remained absolutely alien” to them.). 
116. For an examination of how the West has characterized Chinese law as “not law,” see 
Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002). 
117. Edward Harper Parker, Comparative Chinese Family Law, 8 CHINA REV. 67, 69 (1879) 
(stating that to study Chinese law is to study “a living past, and converse with fossil men”).  
118. HEGEL, supra note 112, at 116 (“The history of the world travels from East to West, for 
Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning.”). 
119. PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA: AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITINGS 
ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 151 (1984). 
120. Promoting culture change may even be viewed as forcing Western culture on others 
while simultaneously denying that this is in fact the agenda. See RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF 
CULTURE 6 (1952) (The “world-wide…diffusion of [Western culture] has protected us as man had 
never been protected before from having to take seriously the civilizations of other peoples; it has 
given to our culture a massive universality that we have long ceased to account for historically, 
and which we read off rather as necessary and inevitable.”). 
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be described, compared, and appreciated, but not critically appraised. 
For example, culture is a non-issue in economics because economists 
generally believe that the right economic policy will produce the desired 
economic result without regard to culture. Moreover, culture is an un-
comfortable realm for economists to operate in, perhaps because “it pre-
sents definitional problems, is difficult to quantify, and operates in a 
highly complex context with psychological, institutional, political, geo-
graphic, and other factors.”121 By contrast, anthropologists study cul-
tures but are often unwilling to evaluate cultural norms and practices of 
another society.122 As a noted sociologist observed,  
In the humanities and liberal circles generally, a rigid orthodoxy 
now prevails that can be summarized as follows: Culture is a 
symbolic system to be interpreted, understood, discussed, deline-
ated, respected, and celebrated as the distinctive product of a par-
ticular group of people, of equal worth with all other such prod-
ucts. But it should never be used to explain anything about the 
people who produced it.123 
Other reasons why cultural explanations may be disfavored in certain 
intellectual circles include concerns about cultural determinism,124 that 
is, relying on culture as an “over-determining”125 factor, the possible 
misuse of culture “by reactionary analysts and public figures” as a way 
to “blame the victim”126 or to avoid examining structural causes of pov-
 
121. Lawrence E. Harrison, Introduction: Why Culture Matters, in CULTURE MATTERS, su-
pra note 3, at xxv. 
122. See, e.g., Richard A. Shweder, Moral Maps, “First World” Conceits, and the New 
Evangelists, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 160 (“[T]he assertion that ‘culture matters’ is 
a way of saying that some cultures are impoverished or backward, whereas others are enriched or 
advanced.”). In a similar vein, in 1947, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological 
Association declined to endorse the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights be-
cause it viewed the Declaration as ethnocentric. Huntington, supra note 69, at xxvi. 
123. Orlando Patterson, Taking Culture Seriously: A Framework and an Afro-American Illus-
tration, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 202–03. 
124. Sen, supra note 5, at 46–50 (criticizing cultural comparisons between Ghana and South 
Korea as an example of cultural determinism because such comparisons often ignore other differ-
ences: class, politics, the educational system, the relationship Korea had with Japan and the 
United States, etc.); id. at 38 (criticizing the belief by some that “the fates of countries are effec-
tively sealed by the nature of their respective cultures”) (emphasis in original). 
125. Patterson, supra note 123, at 203. This means relying on a “simplistic or untenable con-
ception of culture” and using it “in a crudely deterministic way” to explain certain groups’ prob-
lems, so that culture is viewed as “a fixed, explanatory black box invoked to explain anything and 
everything about the group.” Id. In contrast, Professor Sen favors a different approach, “[c]ultural 
interrelations within a broad framework,” in which “culture, seen in a dynamic and interactive 
way, is one important influence among many others.” Sen, supra note 5, at 52, 55. 
126. Patterson, supra note 123, at 204. Professor Patterson rejects the argument that cultural 
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erty,127 and the desire to promote cultural diversity and ethnic pride.128 
Thus, the following statement is an accurate description of the ambigu-
ous role ascribed to culture: “We all realize that before we resort to cul-
ture today to explain the differences in economic progress or political 
attitudes among nations and ethnic groups, we prefer to find other ex-
planations.”129 
Despite a general reluctance to study and appraise culture, increas-
ingly, it is being recognized in one way or another as an important factor 
in economic development and in related areas.130 In fact, some have as-
serted that culture plays a primary role, “culture makes almost all the 
difference. Witness the enterprise of expatriate minorities—the Chinese 
in East and Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West Af-
rica, Jews and Calvinists throughout much of Europe, and on and on.”131 
Others acknowledge the link between cultural influences and economic 
                                                                                                                                      
explanations amount to blaming the victim. If a person who has low self-esteem and behaves in 
self-defeating ways as a result of having been abused is told by someone to go to a psychologist 
to seek therapy, “[i]t would be absurd to accuse that person of blaming the victim. Yet this is ex-
actly what happens when a sympathetic analysis is condemned for even hinting that some Afro-
American problems may be the tragic consequences of their cultural adaptation to an abusive 
past.” Id. 
127. Id.; see also Rao & Walton, supra note 91, at 10. 
128. Patterson, supra note 123, at 204. 
129. Nathan Glazer, Disaggregating Culture, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 220. 
130. Multi-country studies have revealed cultural or regional differences in rights observa-
tion. See Layna Mosley & Saika Uno, Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Foreign Di-
rect Investment and Human Rights, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of The American Po-
litical Science Association, Boston, Aug. 28–Sept. 1, 2002, http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/ 
papers/045/045008WayLucan.pdf (finding a correlation between regions and labor rights, with 
the Asian and Pacific regions not as supportive of labor rights as Europe, though more protective 
than the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America). There is also a differentiation as to 
women’s rights, see Clair Apodaca, Measuring Women’s Economic and Social Rights Achieve-
ment, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 139, 163–65 (1998) (showing that regional differences in women’s rights 
may be explained by “culturally specific attitudes towards women’s status, developed under dif-
fering historical and economic conditions.”); and rule of law and good governance, see Amir 
Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance 
(November 22, 2004) (showing linkage between culture and adherence to good governance 
norms, with cultures that emphasize individual autonomy and egalitarianism scoring better gener-
ally). 
131. David Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, in CULTURE MATTERS, supra 
note 3, at 2. See generally DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (1999). I 
have elsewhere examined the market dominance of certain ethnic groups, some recent immigrants 
in the United States and other countries, and other historical “middlemen minorities” throughout 
the world. See Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale? 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1521 (2003); see also AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003) (describing the market domi-
nance of ethnic minorities such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Jews in Russia, and the Ibos 
in Africa). For a review of Chua’s book, see Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Develop-
ment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1044 (2004). 
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success132 even as they caution that a cultural exploration must be bal-
anced and examined “within a broad framework,”133 so that we neither 
neglect culture nor privilege it “in stationary and isolated terms.”134 
B. A Brief Look at Markets and Culture 
As culture scholars have observed, “culture is not an independent 
variable. It is influenced by numerous other factors, for example, geog-
raphy and climate, politics, the vagaries of history.”135 Culture influ-
ences institutions even more strongly, “culture is the mother 
and…institutions are the children,”136 or vice versa. For example, ac-
cording to the noted Jamaican-born sociologist, Professor Orlando Pat-
terson, Afro-American cultural models of “compensatory sexuality” and 
“unsecured paternity,”137 celebrating early marriage and high fertility, 
had roots in the economic institutions of slavery and sharecropping. 
Similarly, even though the Japanese insist that eating whale meat has 
deep cultural significance, and thus they should be exempt from the in-
ternational ban on whaling,138 this cultural preference has economic 
 
132. Sen, supra note 5, at 40. 
133. Id. at 52. 
134. Id. Professor Sen warned against seeing culture as all-determining, cautioning that Max 
Weber had claimed that Confucianism did not promote rational instrumentalism and was unsuit-
able for an industrial economy. Id. at 48. 
135. Harrison, Why Culture Matters, supra note 121, at xxviii; see also JARED DIAMOND, 
GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL 417–18 (1997) (“[C]ultural factors and influences…loom large…. 
Some of that cultural variation is no doubt a product of environmental variation…. A minor cul-
tural factor may arise for trivial, temporary local reasons, become fixed, and then predispose a 
society toward more important cultural choices….”). 
136. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?, in 
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 75; see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 117 (1990). In explaining the different 
developments that have taken root in the former colonies of Britain and Spain in the Americas, 
North noted that “[i]n the former, an institutional framework has evolved that permits the com-
plex impersonal exchange necessary to political stability and to capture the potential economic 
gains of modern technology. In the latter, personalistic relationships are still key to much of the 
political and economic exchange.” 
Similarly,  
[a]lthough formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial deci-
sions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are 
much more impervious to deliberate policies. These cultural constraints not only con-
nect the past with the present and future, but provide us with a key to explaining the 
path of historical change. 
Id. at 6. 
137. Patterson, supra note 123, at 212. 
138. In 1982, the International Whaling Commission adopted a moratorium on whaling. Ja-
pan was one of the few countries that opposed the ban. See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Thirty-fourth 
Report of the Int’l Whaling Comm’n, at 1 (1982). 
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roots in the postwar period, when non-whale protein sources were 
scarce and the Japanese began to rely on whale meat for school 
lunches.139 In a similar vein, Japan’s lifetime employment system and its 
high savings rate, generally deemed to be an essential component of the 
country’s cultural characteristics, came out of the post-World War II ex-
perience; lifetime employment was instituted to control labor strife, 
while first-hand experiences of deprivation and shortages led to a gen-
eral practice of saving.140 “Thus it is difficult to disentangle culturally 
derived behaviors from behaviors that have been enhanced or encour-
aged by the economic system.”141 
Although development policy has emphasized formal laws and for-
mal institutions,142 Douglass North’s work defines institutions broadly, 
as the “rules of the game in a society or, more formally,…the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction,”143 thus making room 
for culture. North suggests that informal constraints, derived “from so-
cially transmitted information [that is] a part of the heritage that we call 
culture,” can have a profound impact on institutional development.144 
Such informal constraints are part of the “governing structure,” “codes 
of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions” that shape our “daily 
interaction with others, whether within the family, in external social re-
lations, or in business activities.”145 In this respect, “[c]ultural norms 
and beliefs can be seen as the deepest level of institution, and thus the 
same framework can illuminate the role of cultural differences in eco-
nomic performance.”146 Rather than study only formal institutions and 
 
139. Suvendrini Kakuchi, Tokyo Persists with Bid to Lift Whaling Ban, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, Nov. 13, 1997. 
140. Michael Porter, Attitudes, Values, Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity, in 
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 24. 
141. Id.. 
142. See supra notes 59–68 and accompanying text. 
143. NORTH, supra note 136, at 3. 
144. Id. at 37. For a discussion of new institutional economics and how different types of in-
stitutional arrangements or governance structure will play a part in determining the cost and bene-
fit associated with the transaction, see Cao, supra note 1, at 865 n.86. 
145. NORTH, supra note 136, at 36. 
146. Christopher Clague & Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Preface to 573 ANNALS 8, 10 
(JAN. 2001) (citations omitted). For an example of the relationship between culture and informal 
institutions, information transmission and economic development, see, e.g., Clifford Geertz, The 
Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 28 (1978). 
Others have studied how informal institutions, including cultural norms and practices, may be 
adapted to cope with problems of coordination and information asymmetry. See Karla Hoff & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction: Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets—Puzzles and 
Policy Perspectives, 4 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 235, 243 (1990) (discussing an indigenous solu-
tion to an imperfect legal system, the “usufruct loan” allowing the lender to occupy and use the 
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laws and how to change them, North has focused on informal institu-
tions, cultural norms and practices and whether they present informal 
constraints to the achievement of economic objectives. The question is 
whether such informal constraints, if they exist, can be transformed.147 
There are many instances in which such efforts have been attempted, 
historically and currently. For example, scholars have found that the 
vast cultural differences between the Italian North and South, and the 
pervasive lack of trust manifested in the latter, are a contributing factor 
to the economic discrepancy between the two regions.148 At the same 
time, they have observed that Italy’s efforts to decentralize public policy 
and administration and promote civil society in the 1970s were key to 
the successful advancement of trust in the South and consequently rela-
tively efficient economic exchanges.149 In other words, culture may be 
influenced by a combination of many factors, including the type of poli-
cies and institutions put in place, as well as historical, economic and po-
litical circumstances. 
A culture change project should be considered if certain cultural at-
tributes are “harmful to economic productivity.”150 For example, re-
gimes committed to Islamization, or Islamic economics, ban interest be-
cause they believe devout Muslims must resist Mammon—the evils 
flowing from immoral economic gain.151 Even assuming this practice 
enjoys real support on cultural or religious grounds,152 banning interest 
                                                                                                                                      
borrower’s land during the term of the loan); Karla Hoff and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Modern Eco-
nomic Theory and Development, in FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE FUTURE IN 
PERSPECTIVE 389 (Gerald M. Meier & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2000). 
147. In reference to a cultural model in the black community that does not condemn early 
marriage or high birth rates, Professor Patterson also cautioned that this model is not static be-
cause “although cultural continuities certainly exist, people are not slaves to them. They use them 
and they can change them if they really want to.” Patterson, supra note 123, at 218; see also Rao 
& Walton, supra note 91, at 17. 
148. See, e.g., ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN 
MODERN ITALY (1993). Putnam found that civic culture made all the difference in Northern Italy, 
where networks of associations and ties and the norms of trust they produce and sustain helped 
overcome collective action problems and made individuals and groups more productive. Id. at 
182. See also EDWARD BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY 85 (1958) (de-
scribing the people of the Montegrano district in southern Italy as subscribing to a norm of 
“amoral familism” whereby one should “[m]aximize the material, short-run advantage of nuclear 
family; assume that all others will do likewise”); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 345–46 (2000). 
149. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 148; FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 
97-111 (1995). 
150. Kuran, supra note 4, at 120. 
151. TIMUR KURAN, ISLAM & MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF ISLAMISM, at 
ix (2004). 
152. TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 230 (1995) (discussing “cultural prefer-
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has economic consequences. Certainly equity-based and interest-free fi-
nancial instruments serve a useful economic purpose;153 however, it 
does not follow that interest-bearing lending should be banned on eco-
nomic grounds. 
The ban on interest was imposed fourteen centuries ago on an agrar-
ian and nomadic economy, perhaps due to Islam’s prohibition of an an-
cient Arabian practice whereby defaulting debtors were penalized by 
having their debt doubled and redoubled, resulting in the enslavement of 
many poor people.154 More than sixty countries now have Islamic banks 
that do not offer or charge interest and some among them, Pakistan and 
Iran, outlaw interest, forcing even foreign subsidiaries to adopt Islamic 
methods of deposit taking and lending.155 But from an economic stand-
point, the ban is unnecessary because of vastly different conditions that 
exist in today’s economy. For example, instead of enslavement, we have 
bankruptcy laws. The ban is not only anachronistic but also economi-
cally detrimental. Given the fact that interest plays a central role in the 
modern economy, shunning interest is likely to mean non-participation 
in the global economic system156 and prohibitions on economic ar-
rangements such as mortgages, credit cards, currency hedging or futures 
contracts.157 An interest ban is also damaging because it is economically 
inefficient. The ban prohibits people from making choices about the de-
gree of risks they are willing to take, forcing people to engage in “time-
consuming stratagems to disguise interest charges…, [raising] the costs 
of negotiating and monitoring financial agreements.”158 When viewed 
                                                                                                                                      
ence falsification” by the public); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. 
L. REV. 903, 929, 937 (1996). 
153. Kuran, supra note 4, at 123. Proponents of Islamic banking argue that by forcing finan-
ciers to invest directly in a venture, rather than merely charge interest for the capital loaned, the 
system encourages more prudent lending and prevents “future Enrons and Argentina,” presuma-
bly because everyone would have to spend within his or her means. Jerry Useem, Banking on Al-
lah, FORTUNE, June 10, 2002, at 154 (the downside of profit-and-loss sharing is that it tends to 
attract high-risk ventures from entrepreneurs). 
154. Kuran, supra note 4, at 133. 
155. Timur Kuran, The Genesis of Islamic Economics: A Chapter in the Politics of Muslim 
Identity, 64 SOC. RESEARCH 301, 301-02 (1997). 
156. KURAN, ISLAM & MAMMON, supra note 151, at ix.  
157. Jerry Useem, supra note 153, at 154. Other financial arrangements such as derivatives 
and stock options may also be prohibited. Currency hedging would not be allowed because of 
gharar, a principle that prohibits one from profiting off another’s uncertainty. Nor would futures 
contracts be allowed. Id. There is disagreement about whether Islam allows the issuance of bonds. 
Stocks are allowed. Id. 
158. Kuran, supra note 4, at 124. Through the murabaha, parties may get around the interest 
ban. For example, a bank may buy a computer for a client who agrees to buy it back with a 
markup as a form of interest. Virginia Postrel, Islamic Economic Principles May Sound like Just 
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within an overall context of economic development in the Middle East, 
some scholars from the region have argued that this and other practices 
have contributed to the “commercial crisis” in the Middle East, as “the 
West developed commercial institutions more efficient than those of Is-
lam.”159 
Other examples of economically detrimental cultural traits include 
ethnic or caste segregation and schooling restrictions for girls. These 
practices may enjoy widespread public support, even from members of 
the negatively affected group,160 even though they are harmful to the 
group’s own economic advancement (and violate norms of human 
rights). India’s caste system is rightly viewed as a human rights issue 
but also increasingly as a hurdle to the country’s socioeconomic devel-
opment.161 By perpetuating the notion of deserved and inherited ine-
quality, the system extinguishes the aspirational capacity of the lower 
caste members, limits their occupational choices, closing off possibili-
ties for upward mobility and “hinders efforts to escape from poverty…. 
                                                                                                                                      
What the Middle East Needs. In Practice, Things are More Complicated., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 
2004, at C2. For a discussion of economic arrangements that can be put together to comply with 
the interest ban, see Islamic Banking Comes of Age—But What Next?, 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=944 (login required). Islamic finance 
has grown and there is now a Dow Jones Islamic Index, which includes companies that do not 
produce items forbidden by Islam and have a low level of debt or earnings from interest. Id. at 3. 
Despite the inefficiencies involved, clerics have generally endorsed the ban, partly because “the 
elevation of religious values would enhance their own authority. Weak governments…have had 
their own reasons to support Islamist efforts to define, articulate, and, where necessary, invent an 
Islamic way of life” to stay in power. Timur Kuran, The Religious Undercurrents of Muslim Eco-
nomic Grievances, http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kuran.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). 
159. Timur Kuran, The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Under-
development in the Middle East 39 (USC Center for Law, Economics and Organization, Research 
Paper Series, Research Paper No. C01-12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=276377 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); see also Timur Kuran, Why the Mid-
dle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation, 18 
J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (Summer 2004), available at http://www.atypon-link.com/AEAP/doi/ 
abs/10.1257/0895330042162421 (describing Islamist opposition to interest and insurance). But 
see Jack A. Goldstone, Islam, Development, and the Middle East: A Comment on Timur Kuran’s 
Analysis (Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Forum 7, 2003) 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/economic_growth_and_trade/eg/forum_series/f7_comments_on 
_kuran.pdf (generally agreeing with Kuran but arguing that his thesis is incomplete). For a posi-
tive assessment of Islamic banking, especially its compatibility with microfinance, see Rahul 
Dhumale and Amela Sapcanin, An Application of Islamic Banking Principles to Microfinance 1 
(Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Dev. Programme, in cooperation with the Mid-
dle East & North Africa Region, World Bank, Technical Note 23073 1999), available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/128748/An%20Application%20of%20Islamic%20 
Bank%20Principles.pdf. 
160. Kuran, supra note 4, at 130. 
161. B.S. Sule, Illiteracy in India, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1996, at 21. 
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It thus causes economic harm through mechanisms that shape Indian be-
liefs, preferences, and behaviors.”162 An important work by the noted 
economists George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton demonstrates how an 
individual’s understanding of his or her own self, which is in turn tied to 
his or her socially constructed being as a “Hindu,” an “untouchable,” 
determines access to education, trading group, and social network and is 
critically connected to his or her economic performance and success.163 
The caste system continues “to limit economic efficiency by distorting 
educational and occupational choices.”164 As studies have shown, eco-
nomic growth has not weakened the rigidity of the caste system. It has 
remained remarkably durable, partly because the system rests on cul-
tural beliefs that the lower castes are simply where they are because of 
past sins. 
Similarly, schooling restrictions for girls, often founded on cultural 
preferences favoring boys, have significant implications for economic 
development. Studies have shown that “when a society denies girls an 
education it loses economic competitiveness, if only by condemning all 
children, including boys, to be raised by ignorant mothers in households 
deficient in intellectual stimulation.”165 Along a similar line, it is in-
creasingly clear that “[g]ender equality is not only a goal in its own 
right, but an essential ingredient for achieving all other Millennium De-
velopment Goals to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, reduce child 
mortality, combat AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, etc., as declared by 
the United Nations in 2002.166 Gender is clearly a human rights issue as 
well as a development issue. A World Bank study reported that as the 
Middle East and North Africa are embarking on an export-oriented, 
market-based development that would necessarily rely less on natural 
resources and more on human resources, women’s participation would 
be crucial to economic development there, as it was in East Asia. Yet, 
women are currently “an untapped reservoir of human potential for 
countries in the region.”167 
 
162. Kuran, supra note 4, at 118. 
163. Id. at 119; see also George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. 
ECON. 715 (2000); George Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woe-
ful Tales, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST’S BOOK OF TALES 23–44 (Cambridge U. Press) (1984) 
(explaining how a caste economy may be self-perpetuating). 
164. Kuran, supra note 4, at 134. 
165. Kuran, supra note 4, at 132. 
166. WORLD BANK GENDER AND DEV. GROUP, GENDER EQUALITY & THE MILLENNIUM 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 21 (2003). 
167. THE WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT: GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, at xiii (2004) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, MENA 
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A comprehensive study on India demonstrates that “female education 
is the single most important determinant of any improvement (change) 
in living standards in health and education.”168 The results of this study 
have been replicated in empirical studies from different countries and 
confirm that education for girls produces huge rippling effects, such as 
“improved birth spacing, lower infant and child mortality and morbidity, 
and enhanced educational attainment of children.”169 
Although the World Bank recognized that “gender and family values 
are likely to be treated as the ultimate test of cultural authenticity,”170 it 
also stressed that “gender is ultimately also an economic issue.”171 As 
such, addressing the “gender agenda” is not only a cultural, social, or 
anthropological issue,172 but also an economic development issue173 
with significant implications for economic growth, productive employ-
ment and poverty reduction.174 Unfortunately, as the study noted, most 
of the efforts on schooling girls have focused on overcoming external 
constraints, such as lack of schools, teachers, and textbooks, and thus 
“on supplying education for girls.”175 But as I have argued in this Arti-
cle, more needs to be done to address internal constraints, or as the 
World Bank puts it, on increasing “girls’ demand for education.”176 This 
                                                                                                                                      
DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. Other studies show that gender inequality in education has a direct, 
negative impact on economic growth by lowering the quality of human capital; interestingly, the 
data also suggests that differences in growth rates between East Asia and Sub Saharan Africa, 
South Asia, and the Middle East are attributable in part to gender differences among the regions. 
Stephan Klasen, Does Gender Inequality Reduce Growth and Development? Evidence from 
Cross-County Regressions 17–20 (The World Bank, Dev. Research Group, Working Paper Se-
ries, Paper No. 7, 1999). 
168. Surji S. Bhalla, Suraj Saigal & Nabhojit Basu, Girls’ Education is It: Nothing Else Mat-
ters (Much) (World Development Report 2003/04), at 2. For example, there is a consistent and 
strong correlation between higher levels of educational achievement among adult females and 
lower infant mortality rates. Id. at 40. By contrast, there is no such positive correlation between 
increased state expenditures and improvements in living standard—in fact, the opposite, that state 
spending has “a statistically significant and negative effect on improvement in living standards.” 
Id. at 57. 
169. WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 167, at 28. 
170. Id. at xiv; see also id. at 20 (discussing how gender-related reforms “became an impor-
tant symbol of resistance to modernization and—westernization”). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 1. 
173. Id. at xiv; see also id. at 1–4 (discussing the costs of low participation of women in the 
economy and the benefits of enhanced participation). 
174. Id. at 14. See also id. at 18 (discussing how discrimination against women impedes eco-
nomic efficiency); WORLD BANK GENDER AND DEV. GROUP, supra note 166, at 6 (“Investment 
in human capital, especially girls’ and women’s education and health, raises productivity.”). 
175. WORLD BANK, MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 167, at 38. 
176. Id. 
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will necessarily involve efforts at culture change, that is, to change the 
widespread perception especially among rural and poor urban families 
that boys have a right to education but not girls, because girls should 
prepare themselves for marriage, not jobs.177 As the authors of a one-
hundred-country study concluded, underinvestment in girls and their 
education “is not an efficient economic choice” and, to a large extent, 
“can be explained by religious preference and underlying characteristics 
of societies.”178 Law and development must change such preferences. 
Where the objectives of economic development are incompatible 
with some cultural practice, what should, from a development perspec-
tive, be done to address this conflict? Clearly, there is no uniform solu-
tion applicable to all countries. In recent years, some nationals of Latin 
American, African, and Asian countries179 have themselves opted to ad-
dress the culture question to alleviate what they believe to be cultural 
obstacles to development, working specifically to promote a “cultural 
reorientation”180 of their countries by exploring whether certain values 
may be “development-prone” and “development-resistant.”181 Indeed, as 
Amartya Sen noted, there is now plenty of evidence to suggest that 
“[c]ultural influences can make a major difference to work ethics, re-
sponsible conduct, spirited motivation, dynamic management, entrepre-
neurial initiatives, willingness to take risks, and a variety of other as-
pects of human behavior which can be critical to economic success.”182 
Although culture and its relationship to economics has been explored 
 
177. Id. at 39. 
178. David Dollar & Roberta Gatti, Gender Inequality, Income, and Growth: Are Good Times 
Good for Women? 2 (The World Bank, Dev. Research Group, Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
1, 1999). 
179. To the extent that evaluations of culture and the movement for culture change come 
from those “within” the culture, it may alleviate the concern that the push for culture change is 
itself an act of cultural imperialism.  
One reason is that we are chary of intervening in a culture to change its characteristics, 
assuming we knew how. At a time when we think of all cultures as worthy of equal re-
spect, what justification would we have to intervene—whether that intervention is pub-
lic or private—and change a cultural feature that we think limits economic develop-
ment? 
Glazer, supra note 129, at 222. 
180. Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 136, at 66. 
181. Mariano Grondona, an Argentinean scholar, sets forth a list of twenty cultural factors 
and evaluates each in accordance with whether it is favorable or resistant to economic develop-
ment. Grondona, supra note 3, at 47. 
182. Sen, supra note 5, at 40; see also Kuran, supra note 4, at 120 (“Some elements of any 
given culture are clearly harmful to development; others are manifestly beneficial. Some promote 
intercommunal mistrust and hatred; others fuel peaceful interactions. The persistence of a cultural 
trait may enrich certain groups while keeping others impoverished.”). 
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in different periods of Latin American history,183 the school of thought 
which maintains that “economic development is a cultural process”184 
has gained intellectual ground in Latin America in recent years, due 
perhaps to the collapse of dependency theory.185 As the celebrated Peru-
vian writer Mario Vargas Llosa observed, reforms, economic or other-
wise, in Latin America cannot be successful 
unless they are preceded or accompanied by a reform of our cus-
toms and ideas, of the whole complex system of habits, knowl-
edge, images and forms that we understand by ‘culture.’ The cul-
ture within which we live and act today in Latin America is 
neither liberal nor is it altogether democratic. We have democ-
ratic governments, but our institutions, our reflexes and our men-
tality are very far from being democratic. They remain populist 
and oligarchic, or absolutist, collectivist or dogmatic, flawed by 
social and racial prejudices, immensely intolerant with respect to 
political adversaries, and devoted to the worst monopoly of all, 
that of the truth.186 
That is to say, “[t]he paradox of economic development is that eco-
nomic values are not enough to ensure it. Economic development is too 
important to be entrusted solely to economic values. The values ac-
cepted or neglected by a nation fall within the cultural field.”187 One 
could ask, for example, if certain values and attitudes may be an obsta-
cle to economic progress and whether elite groups—the politicians, the 
military, business-people, clergy, intellectuals, and leftists— in Latin 
America subscribe to such values and attitudes.188 
In a provocative article, a Cameroonian scholar questions the African 
mindset189 that subscribes to values not conducive to economic pro-
 
183. For a discussion of the various efforts in Latin America towards effectuating changes in 
values and attitudes, see Lawrence E. Harrison, Promoting Progressive Cultural Change, in 
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 297–99 (discussing works by eminent writers from Vene-
zuela, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Spain, Peru, among others, that question whether traditional 
Ibero-American values have a retarding effect on economic change in the region). 
184. Grondona, supra note 3, at 46. 
185, Dependency theory generally holds that given the structural power system endemic to 
the international economic framework, developing countries are consigned to a perpetual position 
of dependency on the industrialized, economically advanced country. See Lan Cao, Law and Eco-
nomic Development: A New Beginning?, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 545, 551–54 (1997). 
186. Harrison, supra note 183, at 297–98 (citation omitted). 
187. Grondona, supra note 3, at 46. 
188. Carlos Alberto Montaner, Culture and the Behavior of Elites in Latin America, in 
CULTURE MATTERS, supra note 3, at 56. 
189. Despite the immense “diversity—the vast number of subcultures” in Africa, the author 
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gress, for example, exalting the past rather than the future,190 associating 
authority and dominance with birth status rather than merit,191 subordi-
nating the individual to the community,192 excessively celebrating con-
viviality and rejecting open conflict,193 and “attribut[ing] very little im-
portance…to the financial and economic aspects of life.”194 Although 
African culture, according to him, is “one of the most—if not the 
most—humanistic cultures in existence,”195 “peaceful cultural revolu-
tions”196 must be undertaken “to change Africa’s destiny”197 by “assert-
ing the absolute preeminence of education, by suppressing the construc-
tion of religious structures and other palaces to the detriment of schools, 
and by modifying the content of the curricula, accenting not only sci-
ence but especially the necessary changes of the African society.”198 The 
educational system in Africa must promote critical thinking, dissent, the 
importance of creating “businesspeople, and therefore job creators,”199 
and changes in the role of women in African society.200 To transform the 
economic culture, “[w]e must accept profit as the engine of develop-
ment.”201 
Not just in African countries but in many traditional village societies, 
“other-regarding and redistributive norms” as well as strong authority 
                                                                                                                                      
believes that it is possible to generalize about African culture because “there is a foundation of 
shared values, attitudes, and institutions that binds together the nations south of the Sahara, and in 
many respects those to the north as well.” Etounga-Manguelle, supra note 136, at 67. 
190. This means an absence of “dynamic perception of the future.” Id. at 69. 
191. This means that “[i]n Africa, you must be born dominant; otherwise you have no right to 
power except by coup d’etat.” Id. at 70. 
192. One of the byproducts of this norm is that “[t]he concept of individual responsibility 
does not exist in our hyper-centralized traditional structures. In Cameroon, the word ‘responsible’ 
translates as ‘chief.’” Id. at 71. Another byproduct is that without the notion of individual respon-
sibility, “those that occupy an intermediate position in the hierarchy” are held in contempt, as it is 
understood that the one to solve a problem is only the minister himself. Id. 
193. This means “[f]riendship comes before business” and differences, even legitimate ones, 
are suppressed in order to maintain social harmony. “In some African societies, the avoidance of 
conflict means that justice cannot be rendered in the daytime.” Id. at 72. 
194. Id. This means that “[o]ther than some social groups like the well-known Bamileke of 
Cameroon or the Kamba of Kenya, the African is a bad H. economicus.” Id. 
195. Id. at 75. African humanistic values include “the solidarity beyond age classification and 
social status; social interaction; the love of neighbor, whatever the color of his skin; the defense 
of the environment, and so many others.” Id. 
196. Id. at 76. 
197. Id. at 75. 
198. Id. at 76. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 77. 
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patterns are among the most cherished and widely accepted norms.202 
Close-knit village communities characterized by strong kinship and 
other personalistic ties tend to be “‘group-focused’ societies,” which 
nurture a presumption against individualistic pursuits that may elevate 
an individual above his or her group or threaten the traditional pattern of 
authority.203 Norms against individual accumulation of wealth are either 
internalized or enforced by severe sanctions that run the gamut from 
public humiliation and ostracism to even more outlandish accusations, 
for example, that individuals who violate such norms will either be pun-
ished by a supernatural power or are themselves exploiting others 
through witchcraft or other treacherous means.204 To make amends, such 
enriched individuals are expected to comply with the community’s re-
distributive norms by sharing their surplus with others.205 Norms of 
solidarity are useful as they ensure the survival of all. In such societies, 
“[p]rivate wealth accumulation is perceived as an antisocial behavior 
because it is an attempt to break away from traditional solidarity net-
works.”206 Yet such norms of “‘[f]orced mutual help’”207 can also pre-
vent the accumulation of wealth, capital investment, and growth and 
suppress individual initiatives. 
Even more insidiously, such norms also tend to favor a status quo 
maintenance, further entrenching traditional elites—chiefs, elders, 
priests, typically “old men belonging to the dominant lineages”208—who 
“do not accept that commoners rise above them by acquiring old or new 
symbols of wealth and status.”209 Witchcraft accusations, hurled against 
dynamic upstarts who dare challenge the traditional hierarchical struc-
ture, are of course prohibited if uttered against traditional elites.210 
Development agencies that introduced projects which might disturb 
the status of traditional elites have encountered strong resistance.211 For 
example, in Guinea Bissau, when an NGO instituted a program to train 
 
202. Anita Abraham & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Participatory Development: Where Culture 
Creeps In, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 211. 
203. Id. at 212–13. 
204. Id. at 213, 216. 
205. Id. at 215. 
206. Id. at 215; see also id. at 215–16 (“[R]edistributive norms that enjoin economically suc-
cessful individuals to share their surplus appear as a form of taxation designed to curb positional 
race for status.”). 
207. Id. at 215. 
208. Id. at 217. 
209. Id. at 216. 
210. Id. 
211. Examples in this paragraph are drawn from Id. at 220–223. 
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professional fishermen and distributed fishing equipment to groups of 
village youths, the local king objected to young members receiving as-
sets when he did not. In a northeastern region of Burkina Faso, an NGO 
helped a women’s group acquire a mill, which was confiscated by the 
local chief who viewed it as a status symbol that should be bestowed 
upon him instead. In the same general area, a local chief who engaged 
in various mischiefs was nonetheless chosen, because he was chief, to 
be the chairman of a village-wide association created by an NGO to im-
prove irrigation. When the chief awarded preferential dealings to his 
brother and pursued other dubious activities, the members did not re-
move him as chairman out of deference to his identity and status. 
Such commitment to authoritarian pattern, status and personal rela-
tionships are likely to conflict with the values of equality, whether it be 
in terms of participation or economic opportunities. Since the currency 
crisis in Asia in 1997, for example, there is a similar effort to change 
“the traditionally particularistic personal relationships that have domi-
nated the East Asian economies”212 because of the possibility that such 
relationships can impede individual initiatives213 or even foster corrup-
tion.214 Other cultural traits, the tradition of taking a “long view,” for 
example, has meant that many East Asian businesses neglected periodi-
cally to monitor the profitability of enterprises. “The supposed virtue of 
such long-term perspectives was reinforced by the cultural propensity to 
 
212. Harrison, supra note 121, at xxiii. 
213. Though personalistic and kinship ties can facilitate economic growth, at some point they 
can also be a drag on economic development, dampening individual incentives to invest and ac-
cumulate wealth. Max Weber, of course, argued that the spread of Calvinism, which emphasized 
“individualistic motives of rational legal acquisition by virtue of one’s own ability and initiative,” 
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 179 (1930), quoted in 
ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 47 (1979), “had the psychologi-
cal effect of freeing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics.” 
WEBER, supra, at 171, quoted in MCFARLANE, supra, at 47. By elevating rational thought over 
superstition and magic and the pursuit of individual over communal interests, Protestantism 
helped to “shatter the fetters of the kinship group.” WEBER, supra, at 139, quoted in 
MCFARLANE, supra, at 50. Subsequent scholars have echoed Weber’s warnings of the fetters of 
kinship. See, e.g., PETER T. BAUER & BASIL S. YARNEY, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDER-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 64 (1957) (“[T]he extended family…is an example of an institution 
which has many advantages in one stage of economic achievement, but which may later become a 
drag on economic development.”); ARTHUR LEWIS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 114 
(1955) (“The extended family system has tremendous advantages in societies living at a subsis-
tence level, but it seems not to be appropriate to societies where economic growth is occurring. In 
such societies it is almost certainly a drag on effort.”). 
214. ARTHUR LEWIS, supra note 213, at 114 (noting that strong group ties may facilitate bu-
reaucratic corruption and nepotism because bureaucrats may be bound first by obligations to tra-
ditional networks rather than to outsiders with superior credentials). 
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see great virtue in delayed gratification and the willingness to suffer in 
the short run in the expectation that in time there would be greater re-
wards for steadfastness.”215 Such values and behaviors were useful at 
the initial stages of development but produced problems at the later 
stages. 
There are efforts underway to confront cultural issues and their rela-
tionship to economic development. In the section below, I examine how 
a positive relationship between the two can be produced, focusing spe-
cifically on the catalyst question, that is, on the ways in which change 
may be effectuated, through internal or external pressure, or by bottom-
up or top-down implementation. 
IV. TO CHANGE A CULTURE 
A. Opposition to the Project 
There are preliminary issues to consider in the course of deliberating 
culture change. First, one is sure to encounter resistance, based on a 
claim of cultural integrity, from culture defenders or multiculturalists 
who oppose what they consider to be an assault on cultural identity. 
Second, opponents of culture change are likely to be even more opposed 
to the project if change is externally imposed or influenced based on the 
notion of cultural self-determination. In the section below, I examine 
those two objections and explore the implications they have for my pro-
posal. 
With respect to the claim that cultures should be defended from 
change, the response is simple: Cultures have always changed—
Orientalist stereotypes about the unchanging nature of the non-West 
notwithstanding.216As Amartya Sen observed, culture is not “independ-
ent, unchanging and unchangeable.”217 History shows that encounters 
initially viewed as threats may transform one’s very perceptions and 
preferences. Something deemed foreign in origin may in fact become 
domesticated and indigenous over time; Turks, for example, no longer 
view as “un-Turklike” French transplants such as specialized secular 
courts to hear commercial disputes.218 Along more mundane lines, al-
 
215. Lucian W. Pye, “Asian Values”From Dynamos to Dominoes?, in CULTURE MATTERS, 
supra note 3, at 253. 
216. See supra notes 111–18 and accompanying text. 
217. Sen, supra note 5, at 44. 
218. Kuran, supra note 4, at 131-32. 
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though chili is not an indigenous Indian spice but was brought to India 
by the Portuguese in the 16th century, it is now considered very much 
Indian.219 
It is often presumed that a particular culture, “Indonesian,” for exam-
ple, is “simply Indonesian.” Yet, history suggests more complexity. In-
donesian history reveals not just Islamic tradition but strong Hindu, 
Buddhist, and Confucian cultural presence and influence.220 Contrary to 
claims by Hindu nationalists, India has a long history of cultural diver-
sity—a thousand years of Buddhist dominance, with Christians present 
since the fourth century and Parsees and Muslims since the eighth cen-
tury. Thus, even when one invokes culture as an identity issue, the term 
often embodies great historical variations and heterogeneity even within 
an individual culture itself.221 
Culture is all the more “nonhomogeneous, nonstatic, and interac-
tive”222 in today’s globalized world. Anthropologists have noted this 
shift223 and the resulting similarities across societies as well as the re-
sulting heterogeneity within societies:224 The modern world is no longer 
“tightly territorialized, spatially bounded…[and] culturally homogene-
ous.”225 Thus, “the boundaries of cultural systems are leaky, and that 
traffic and osmosis are the norm, not the exception.”226 Cultures move 
and interact, and from this process, undergo change. Modern cultures 
are characterized by cracks, fissures, change and transformation. As 
Salman Rushdie described the mongrelized selves spawned from this 
modern condition: 
 
219. Sen, supra note 5, at 44. 
220. Id. at 42. 
221. Id. at 43 (“Cultural determinists often underestimate the extent of heterogeneity within 
what is taken to be ‘one’ distinct culture.”). 
222. Id. at 44. 
223. See, e.g., JAMES CLIFFORD, ROUTES: TRAVEL AND TRANSLATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 246 (1997) (remarking that “[s]eparate places become effectively a single 
community ‘through the continuous circulation of people, money, goods, and information’”). 
224. ARIF DIRLIK, THE POSTCOLONIAL AURA: THIRD WORLD CRITICISM IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 72 (1997) (discussing “global motions of peoples (and, therefore, cultures), 
the weakening of boundaries…[and] simultaneous homogenization and fragmentation within and 
across societies…”); Arjun Appadurai & Carol A. Breckenridge, Why Public Culture?, 1 PUB. 
CULTURE 5, 7 (1988) (“The world which cultural anthropologists have so far taken for granted is 
in the process of vanishing. More and more societies are characterized by profound internal cul-
tural debates….” (citation omitted)). 
225. ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF 
GLOBALIZATION 48 (1996). 
226. Arjun Appadurai, The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition, in 
CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, supra note 4, at 61; see also id. (describing the critical elements 
of culture in globalization as “mixture, heterogeneity, diversity…and plurality.”). 
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I was born an Indian, and not only an Indian, but a Bombayite—
Bombay, that most cosmopolitan, most hybrid, most hotchpotch 
of Indian cities. My writing and thought have therefore been as 
deeply influenced by Hindu myths and attitudes as Muslim 
ones…. Nor is the West absent from Bombay. I was already a 
mongrel self, history's bastard, before London aggravated the 
condition.227 
If cultures have always changed and continue to change, what does it 
mean, then, to defend “authentic” cultures? At its best, it may simply 
mean understanding the lessons of colonialism. And it may simply re-
flect a legitimate concern about repeating the nineteenth century quest 
to civilize the Third World, not justified as it was then, on the basis of 
superior Western morality, but rather, in more sophisticated and accept-
able language of today—as an imperative of modernity. While global 
trade has also meant global diffusion of cultures, one might be con-
cerned that countries with greater power could also overwhelm those 
with lesser power, not just economically but also culturally, with the lat-
ter finding itself in a position of “submissive supplication.”228 
On the other hand, defenders of local cultures may also be quite mis-
guided, and attempts to keep out foreign cultures motivated by much 
less justifiable concerns. A confrontational or hostile stance against the 
influence of foreign cultures—described by proponents as bravely 
standing up to Western domination—may in fact be “deeply foreign-
dependent in a negative and contrary form.”229 In other words, this 
movement defines itself as the “Other,” that which the West is not, in a 
vein not that dissimilar, ironically, from that of the Orientalist tradition. 
Local culture, thus, is understood to be oppositional to or different from 
whatever Western culture is deemed to be. Quite simply, “[s]eeing one-
self as ‘the other’ does less than justice to one’s free and deliberative 
agency.”230 Moreover, often under the banner of protecting local culture, 
these defenders “rule out certain choices, on traditionalist grounds, be-
cause of their ‘foreignness’ (irrespective of what people decide to 
choose, in an informed and reflected way).”231 Citizens, therefore, are 
denied the exercise of cultural options by “political authorities, or by re-
 
227. SALMAN RUSHDIE, In Good Faith, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS 393, 394, 404 (1991). 
228. Rao & Walton, supra note 91, at 20; see also EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND 
IMPERIALISM, at xi (1993) (describing the European view of their colonial enterprise as “bringing 
civilization to primitive or barbaric peoples…[who] deserved to be ruled”). 
229. Sen, supra note 5, at 54. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 53. 
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ligious establishments, or by grand guardians of taste.”232 
With the force and leverage of public international law behind them, 
defenders of culture cast their project in cultural self-determination lan-
guage233 and disparage internal challenges to cultural traditions as for-
eign and inauthentic.234 Public international law thus puts its force and 
weight into preserving cultures and insulating them from change, as-
suming in essence that international law must favor cultural integrity 
over cultural change, committing the discipline to “the old-world view 
of cultural diversity as existing across cultures, but not within them.”235 
This is because the right to cultural self-determination has been “inter-
preted to defend cultural groups against the forces of modernization and 
change. Internal cultural ferment is suppressed as law authorizes the ex-
clusion of dissenters who threaten to dilute a culture's distinctive-
ness.”236 
Yet a view that privileges that particular understanding of cultural 
self-determination ignores change and diversity within every culture. 
Anthropologists have noted, for example, that “dissensus…is part and 
parcel of culture and…a shared culture is no more a guarantee of com-
plete consensus than a shared platform in the democratic convention.”237 
Culture is not only about affiliation or loyalty, but also about dissensus 
or dissent, challenge by members who seek to contest and reinterpret 
traditional cultural norms.238 Far from being intrinsically stable or in-
 
232. Id.; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE 
AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM 250 (1999) (“It often turns out that oppressive practices defended by a 
state or group as essential to its survival are no more than the self-interested preferences of its 
current power-elite.”). 
233. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights endows minority cultures with 
rights such as the “right…to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or 
to use their own language.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights art. 3, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (declaring that all state parties must en-
sure the social and cultural rights of their people); Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 
27(1), G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 
1948) (asserting that all persons have a right to participate in the cultural life of the community). 
234. Richard T. Ford, The Repressed Community: Locating the New Communitarianism, 65 
TRANSITION 96, 99 (1995) (describing how the claim that there is “a singular, ‘authentic’ or es-
sential identity…involves more than ignoring the claims of dissenters and marginalized sub-
groups, it requires representing those claims as dishonest or illegitimate”). 
235. Sunder, supra note 7, at 500. This stance also allows public international law to sidestep 
cultural issues because culture has to be preserved and insulated from the critical eye of law under 
the name of cultural integrity, authenticity and self-determination. See supra text and accompany-
ing notes 220-34. 
236. Sunder, supra note 7, at 500. 
237. Appadurai, supra note 226, at 61. 
238. Sunder, supra note 7, at 498; see also Seyla Benhabib, Cultural Complexity, Moral In-
398 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 47:2 
 
 
ert239 or bounded by geographical demarcations, cultures, especially in 
the modern globalized world, are alive and changing, challenged and 
shaped by an ongoing process of internal as well as external pres-
sures.240 
This radically different understanding of culture as dynamic and het-
erogeneous, whether in response to internal or external change, leads to 
a different understanding of law and development and its relationship to 
culture. In a globalized world characterized by transnational cultural ex-
changes and internal cultural challenges, the argument that culture must 
be protected from change is not convincing. As transnational influence 
becomes all the more inevitable, it is also not convincing to claim that 
external influence is per se normatively illegitimate. Indeed, to argue 
otherwise is to concede that certain values, such as egalitarianism, are 
external to certain societies,241 or that certain societies are uniformly 
characterized by certain values only and not other values.242 This as-
sumption that the world is divided into “impenetrable civilizational 
camps” viewed in oppositional terms, such as an Islamic versus a West-
ern camp, obscures the fact that certain values are shared by both.243 Is-
lam, for example, has had a history of celebrating religious freedom, 
tolerance and pluralism; Akbar, a Muslim emperor of India, ordered that 
“no one ‘should be interfered with on account of religion’ and that ‘any-
one is to be allowed to go over to a religion that pleases him.’”244 Dur-
ing the same time period in the 1590s, Europe was in the midst of the 
Inquisitions. Given this history, it is inaccurate to characterize pluralism 
as solely a Western value245 and to reject attempts to influence the de-
                                                                                                                                      
terdependence, and the Global Dialogical Community, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 235, 240 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan 
Glover eds., 1995) (“Very often, cultures are presented as hermetic and sealed wholes; the inter-
nal contradictions and debates within cultures are flattened out; the different conceptual and nor-
mative options which are available to the participants of a given culture and society are ig-
nored.”). Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Brave, Young and Muslim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at 
A31 (describing efforts by Arab-Muslim youth to bring about democracy in the Middle East, to 
reform Islam, and to rediscover its pluralistic tradition). 
239. To the extent that culture defenders wish to preserve cultures from change, their position 
is eerily similar to that of the Orientalists who see non-Western cultures in unchanging, static 
terms. See supra notes 110–18 and accompanying text. 
240. ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF 
GLOBALIZATION 27–65 (1996). 
241. Madhavi Sunder, Enlightened Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 891, 892–93 (2005). 
242. See Amartya Sen, A World Not Neatly Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39. 
243. Id. 
244. Id.  
245. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC 
DEMOCRACY 6 (2003) (demonstrating that liberty, equality, and democracy are compatible with 
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velopment of pluralism in Muslim societies as illegitimate external im-
position.246 
Not only is pluralism part of Islam’s history, it is currently part of the 
“internal struggle within Islam to re-examine its texts and articulate a 
path for how one can accept pluralism and modernity.”247 Shirin Ebadi, 
for example, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003 for her efforts to 
achieve freedom and equality for women within Islamic Iran.248 The 
Arab Human Development Reports issued in 2002, 2003, and 2004 pro-
claimed pluralism to be vital to human development.249 Cultures are in-
creasingly characterized by internal challenges and debates about cul-
tural meanings, identities and values,250 and contrary to the claims of 
those who defend cultures on the grounds of cultural preservation, there 
is no “singular, ‘authentic’ or essential identity”251 that needs to be pre-
served or protected from external influence. 
Besides the fact that seemingly oppositional values are indeed recon-
cilable internally within one culture, so that Islam, for example, can in-
corporate egalitarian and pluralistic commitments, one could also sim-
ply view certain basic values as universal. The Constitution of India 
incorporated rights and reflected values that were drawn from many 
constitutions in the world,252 provoking critics to charge that as such, it 
“‘will break down soon after being brought into operation.’”253 Yet, 
many of India’s Constitution drafters insisted that “India should be 
rightfully able to benefit from the world’s intellectual heritage.”254 
“What the Indian Constitutionalists recognized is that the Enlightenment 
ideals of democracy, equality, reason, and dissent are not and cannot be 
the intellectual properties of Western nations alone, but are rightfully the 
                                                                                                                                      
Islam). 
246. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 888 (2005) (arguing 
that external Western influence is external imposition which will lead to a distortion of the very 
values the West wishes to develop, such as equality and liberty, in nascent Islamic democracies). 
247. Thomas L. Friedman, The Real War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at A19. 
248. Scott MacLeod, One Woman’s Way, TIME INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 15, 2003, at 44, avail-
able at www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2003/press.html. 
249. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2003: BUILDING A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 121. 
250. See supra notes 217–47 and accompanying text; see also Friedman, supra note 238, at 
A31. Neil MacFarquhar, Unexpected Whiff of Freedom Proves Bracing for the Mideast, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1. 
251. Ford, supra note 234, at 99. 
252. Sunder, supra note 241, at 899. 
253. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 325 
(1966) (citation omitted). 
254. Sunder, supra note 241, at 899. 
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treasures of the world.”255 In this sense, culture is understood and 
judged not by its source or geography but “by its manifest use and en-
joyment.”256 As Rabindranath Tagore, who received the Nobel Prize in 
literature in 1913, put it:  
Whatever we understand and enjoy in human products instantly 
becomes ours, wherever they might have their origin. I am proud 
of my humanity when I can acknowledge the poets and artists of 
other countries as my own. Let me feel with unalloyed gladness 
that all the great glories of man are mine.257 
But if certain desirable values have not been part of a particular soci-
ety’s cultural fabric, what then? From a universalist perspective,258 the 
issue is not whether a value is internal or external to a society, or pro-
moted by insiders or outsiders. Salman Rushdie put it this way:  
[I]f by chance there were a universal value that might, for the 
sake of argument, be called freedom, whose enemies—tyranny, 
bigotry, intolerance, fanaticism—were the enemies of us all; and 
if this “freedom” were discovered to exist in greater quantity in 
the countries of the West than anywhere else on earth; and if, in 
the world as it actually exists, rather than in some unattainable 
Utopia, the authority of the United States were the best current 
guarantor of that “freedom”; then might it not follow that to op-
pose the spread of American culture would be to take up arms 
against the wrong foe?259 
A cross cultural or transnational perspective can make a culture re-
ceptive to critical thinking, deliberation and dissent. “The exclusion of 
slaves in one society, untouchables in another, and women in still an-
other may be much harder to sustain when other societies show the way 
 
255. Id. 
256. Sen, supra note 5, at 54. 
257. Id. at 55; see also Amartya Sen, Speech at the Nobel Banquet, (Dec. 10, 1998), 
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1998/sen-speech.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). (re-
ferring to Tagore, Sen noted that, “[h]is universalist, tolerant and rationalist ideals were a strong 
influence on my thinking, and I often recollect them in these divisive times”). Sen has also noted 
elsewhere that Tagore firmly believed “in the ‘non-fragility’ of Indian culture and civilisation; he 
believed that it was broad and of many parts, each related to and influenced by the other. Tagore, 
said Sen, did not believe that there was a conflict between the cultures and civilisations of the 
East and the West, and was against ‘closing the shutters’ to outside influences.” Parvathi Menon, 
A Special Homecoming, FRONTLINE, Jan. 2–15, 1999, available at http://www.frontlineonnet 
.com/fl1601/16011300.htm. 
258. See supra notes 252–57 and accompanying text. 
259. SALMAN RUSHDIE, STEP ACROSS THIS LINE 268–69 (2002). 
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to different types of social arrangements.”260 Cultures that sanction such 
practices will be defended, predictably, by self-interested elites who 
elevate self-determination over other values, for example, equality, rea-
son, freedom.261 But in recent years, liberals and feminists have cri-
tiqued attempts to elevate cultural rights on many grounds, for example, 
that they preserve the status quo at the expense of women and chil-
dren;262 that they tend to “enforce cultural orthodoxy over progressive 
cultural dissent”;263 and that they are preserved often by suppressing in-
dividual autonomy.264 
In the section below, I push this critique further and ask if cultural at-
tributes that constrain economic development should be changed, 
whether by insiders or outsiders, from the top down or the bottom up. 
On this issue I look to Tagore, who while rejecting Western domination 
also rejected the brand of nationalism that would erect walls and close 
off borders. As Tagore said, “we neither have the right nor the power to 
exclude this people [the British] from the building of the destiny of In-
dia.”265 
B. How To Change a Culture 
This section is but the beginning of future works that will provide a 
more detailed, prescriptive agenda addressing the complex normative 
issues involved in culture change. Some of the questions to be explored 
include how culturally-based choices can be altered by governments, 
individuals, NGOs and development agencies; how the social meaning 
of an undesirable practice, refusing education for girls, for example, can 
be changed; the methods of change that may be useful, whether it be 
education, information, persuasion, coercion, or the provision of eco-
nomic incentives; and the institutional arrangements, such as public-
 
260. Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen, Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Tradi-
tion, in RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION 299–320 (Michael Krausz ed., 
1989). 
261. See Sunder, supra note 241, at 894 (“[F]ar from one uber value—democratic self-
determination—the globe pulsates with commitments to a number of incommensurable, universal 
values.”); see also Sen, supra note 5, at 53. 
262. Janet E. Halley, Culture Constraints, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 100, 
103–04 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999); Susan Moller Okin, Reply, in IS MULTICULTURALISM 
BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra, at 115. 
263. Yael Tamir, Siding with the Underdogs, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, 
supra note 262, at 47. 
264. Halley, supra note 262, at 100 (noting how cultural preservation claims focus on the lib-
eration of a culture from external coercion and ignore claims that it constrains and suppresses). 
265. RABINDRANATH TAGORE, NATIONALISM 131 (Greenwood Press 1973) (1917). 
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private partnerships, that would best accomplish the desired objectives. 
Japan is the most obvious example of a country that has successfully 
launched culture change campaigns. When it realized it was militarily 
and economically inferior to Europe, it committed itself to change, not 
just by adopting new legal codes, but also by implementing a systematic 
culture change project.266 During the period known as the Meiji Resto-
ration of 1860, the Japanese saw that they were not equal to “the more 
progressive powers of the world”267 and decided to modernize by bring-
ing foreign experts to Japan and sending Japanese agents abroad to 
study European ways. The Meiji Restoration was a “revolution from 
above” to learn “the ways of the West in order to reform virtually every 
aspect of national life,”268 and through this reformation, defend the 
country from Western threat.269 The Japanese government modeled its 
military and its legal codes after those of Germany. It adopted measures 
to create a sense of nationhood which had been virtually nonexistent 
during the quarter millennium of Tokugawa rule, for example, establish-
ing a national postal service, public education for boys and girls, univer-
sal military service, etc., to “imbue its subjects with a sense of higher 
duty to the emperor and country and to link this patriotism to work.”270 
Throughout its history, Japan took extraordinary efforts to involve the 
Japanese people in various national cultural projects.271 The process in-
cluded interaction and cooperation between Japanese private groups and 
an interventionist Japanese state to formulate and implement programs 
to manage society.272 From the 1600s to the mid 1800s, authorities of 
the shogunate, through “kyoka,” or “moral suasion,” “exhorted peasants 
to work hard, pay their taxes, and avoid luxury.”273 Thus, bureaucracies 
from various ministries were established to run moral suasion cam-
paigns, many of which aimed to instill changes in customary habits, and 
through such changes to encourage the formation of capital and produc-
 
266. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion of Japan’s Meiji Restoration is drawn from Lan-
des, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, supra note 131, at 7–10; see also Cao, The Ethnic 
Question in Law and Development, supra note 131, at 1071-75. 
267. Sidney D. Brown, Okubo Toshimichi: His Political and Economic Policies in Early 
Meiji Japan, 21 J. ASIAN STUD. 183–190 (1961/1962). 
268. Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Re-
form in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 588 (2001). 
269. Bill Ong Hing, Nonelectoral Activism in Asian Pacific American Communities and the 
Implications for Community Lawyering, 8 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 246, 248 n.16 (2002). 
270. Landes, Culture Makes Almost All the Difference, supra note 131, at 10. 
271. SHELDON GARON, MOLDING JAPANESE MINDS 6 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997). 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 7. 
2007] CULTURE CHANGE 403 
 
 
tive investment.274 The Ministry of Education introduced “daily life im-
provement campaigns” to teach “scientific budgeting, better nutrition 
and hygiene, and avoiding wasteful spending on festivals, alcohol, and 
tobacco.”275 The Home Ministry and the Ministry of Education, which 
were responsible for campaigns to reform norms and habits of the 
poor,276routinely received reports from district chiefs containing detailed 
“village-by-village information on the time spent on funerals and wed-
dings and, in the case of weddings, the numbers attending, the type of 
cermemony [sic], and what was served.”277 
To ensure success, the government sought the involvement of com-
munity leaders of women and youth groups, religious organizations and 
other civic associations. It used all available methods—motion pictures, 
handbills distributed to households, posters exhorting savings and fru-
gality278—to supplement moral suasion, promote “middle-class com-
mitments to the modernization of popular beliefs, daily habits, and gen-
der relations,”279 and “eliminate the ‘evil customs of the past.’”280 In 
some instances, the government joined forces with “Western-educated 
Protestant social reformers…to teach the poor the virtues of hard work, 
savings, and self-help”—all with the aim “to improve the diet, hygiene, 
work habits, housing, consumption patterns, and ritual life of the Japa-
nese people.”281 Indeed, as some have put it, “[t]he cultural values un-
derlying Japan’s successful strategy in catching up with the West were 
nurtured and manipulated by the elites in the interest of the develop-
mental state.”282 
To be sure, efforts at culture change are less likely to be controversial 
 
274. In development economics, the elimination of wasteful spending is a necessary step to-
wards capital formation, accumulation, and investment. W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development 
with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CLASSIC 
PERSPECTIVES, CRITIQUES, AND REFLECTIONS 59, 75 (Rajani Kanth ed., 1994). Given the tradi-
tional tendency in many societies to spend surplus capital on “tombs, country houses, temples,” 
and other economically unproductive activities, a key issue in development is to “tempt capital 
into productive channels rather than into the building of monuments,” or spending on funerals, 
weddings and other lavish ceremonies. Id. at 73. 
275. GARON, supra note 271, at 11. 
276. Id. at 15–16. 
277. Id. at 12–13. 
278. Id. at 13. 
279. Id. at 19. 
280. Id. at 20. 
281. Id. 
282. Charlotte G. O’Kelly, The Future of Hong Kong: Prospects, 547 ANNALS 176, 177 
(Sept. 1996) (reviewing CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN, WHO GOVERNS? THE RISE OF THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1995) and WILLIAM K. TABB, THE POSTWAR JAPANESE SYSTEM: 
CULTURAL ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION (1995)). 
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within law and development circles if the underlying cultural norm is at 
odds with modern notions of human rights. Turkey, for example, had re-
quired midwife and nursing students to be virgins and testing could be 
performed to ensure compliance. In 2002, in an effort to be admitted to 
the European Union, Turkey issued a directive banning forced virginity 
testing.283 As a ratifier of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Turkey is obli-
gated to abolish not only discriminatory laws but also “to promote 
equality by breaking down commonly held stereotypes impacting cul-
ture and tradition.”284 Although human rights groups applaud this de-
cree, commentators rightly warn that because Turkey “faces a tension 
between enduring cultural norms and international human rights stan-
dards,” legislation is likely to be inadequate unless the government fol-
lows up with a nationwide educational campaign.285 Such is the situa-
tion in South Africa as well. South Africa’s 2005 ban on virginity testing 
is vociferously opposed by tribal leaders “who saw the legislation as an 
attack on ancient tribal culture and family values.”286 A women’s rights 
leader observed: “For the majority of women who live in rural areas, 
customary law basically consigns them to be minors all their lives, un-
der their fathers, their husbands, their brothers….”287 
Other CEDAW member countries, such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and 
Indonesia, acknowledged that implementing CEDAW has been difficult 
because of “entrenched traditional attitudes regarding women.”288 Given 
“the persistence of cultural norms that give preference to men,”289 ex-
perts in this area have suggested “‘massive awareness campaigns’ at 
both the national and local levels.”290 Similarly, although there are ef-
forts to alter inheritance patterns that exclude women and that are 
“deeply embedded in notions of cultures and tradition,” these efforts 
have occurred primarily at the statutory level.291 Yet unless cultural 
 
283. Chante Lasco, Virginity Testing in Turkey: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights, 9 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2002, at 10, 10. 
284. Hadar Harris, Current Processes for Assessment of Women’s Human Rights in Interna-
tional Law, ASIL INSIGHT, March 2005, www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050316.html; see 
also Lasco, supra note 283, at 13.  
285. Lasco, supra note 283, at 10. 
286. Sharon LaFraniere, Women’s Rights Laws and African Custom Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
30, 2005, at A1. 
287. Id. 
288. Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT’L LAW. 637, 639–41 (Summer 1999). 
289. Id. at 641. 
290. Id. at 640. 
291. Abby Morrow Richardson, Women’s Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to Integrate 
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norms are confronted and altered, through deliberate education cam-
paigns292 and other measures,293 “[t]hese statutory changes generally 
have no practical effect on the great majority of the population.”294 
Indeed, after Egypt’s health minister banned the genital mutilation of 
girls,295 villagers across the country planned to continue the custom and 
even officials in charge of implementing the law acknowledged “that 
some social customs are too potent to be extinguished by law.”296 It was 
not until one of Egypt’s largest nonprofit development groups targeted 
the practice that female genital mutilation became virtually nonexistent 
in Tayeba, a village outside Cairo of mostly Coptic Christians. The 
group pursued an education campaign aimed at women, religious lead-
ers, and unmarried men, portraying the issue as a literacy, family plan-
ning, and health care issue.297 In other words, if a cultural norm such as 
female genital mutilation carries a certain socially constructed meaning 
that is traditionally deemed desirable,298 the underlying meaning must 
be changed before the cultural norm can be successfully altered. The 
development group succeeded because it was able to change the mean-
ing of female genital mutilation, moving it from a cultural or religious 
to a human health domain.299 
The group enters a village only with an invitation signed by commu-
nity leaders, appoints a two-person team to live in the village for as long 
as seven years, trains local volunteers to continue the group’s objectives 
                                                                                                                                      
Cultural Understanding and Legal Reform, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 19, 22. 
292. Id. at 22. 
293. Japan, for example, prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex in re-
cruitment, hiring, assignment, and promotion decisions. Kelly Barrett, Women in the Workplace: 
Sexual Discrimination in Japan, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 5, 6. But the law also al-
lows the Ministry of Labor to “‘make a public announcement’” if an employer fails to comply 
with the Ministry’s directive. Id. “Because of deep-seated cultural norms, the theory behind this 
sanction is that the threat of public embarrassment will be enough to prevent companies from dis-
criminating on the basis of gender.” Id. 
294. Richardson, supra note 291, at 19. 
295. In Egypt, the procedure is performed by midwives or barbers, often without anesthesia 
and under non-hygienic conditions. Neil MacFarquhar, Egypt Facing Defiance of Ban on Genital 
Mutilation of Girls, GLOBE AND MAIL NEWS, Aug. 19, 1996, at N14. 
296. Id. 
297. John Lancaster, Village Gives Up a Painful Ritual, WASH. POST, June 21, 1998, at A19. 
298. For example, in countries that practice female genital mutilation, the practice is justified 
on the grounds that girls not subject to female genital mutilation will become nymphomaniacs, 
and therefore those who have been subject to the procedure are “good” girls. Philip Smucker, 
Egyptian Women Fight Circumcision, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 2001, at A4. 
299. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. at 903, 905, 
950–52 (1996) (describing efforts in the U.S. to change the meaning of smoking, from one asso-
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after the team leaves, and conducts follow-up work. Volunteers visited 
local houses to give women information on family planning and health 
care before slowly introducing the topic of female circumcision. Despite 
initial hostile reactions, the group has achieved a 70 percent success 
rate, with success being determined by asking whether girls remain un-
circumcised past the age of twelve.300 The Egyptian education cam-
paign, headed by the Ministry of Health, has been funded by U.S. and 
U.N. money and has garnered a 75 percent eradication rate even in 
Egypt’s more remote villages.301 Similar successes have been reported 
elsewhere, for example, Senegal. There, a nonprofit organization, along 
with local women enrolled in a course on health care, launched a cam-
paign of “information and persuasion” to convince more than 400 vil-
lages to end genital cutting.302 
China, too, has tried culture change. In an effort to address the grow-
ing problem of “missing” girls in China, resulting from abortion of fe-
male fetuses due to the traditional Chinese preference for boy children, 
the Chinese government has instituted a massive campaign, including 
subsidies, to reverse the trend.303 Under this program, families of girl 
students receive free tuition for their children. Additionally, because 
preference for boy children, especially in rural areas, reflected the fam-
ily’s desire for male farm laborers and old-age care traditionally pro-
vided by sons, the government introduced a pilot program under which 
300,000 rural elders are entitled to receive a general annual pension of 
$180 if they had only one child or daughters.304 To change traditional 
attitudes, the government urged schools to hold parades in a “Care for 
Girls” program, and billboards announce a “Respect Girls” campaign.305 
Current efforts undertaken in many developing countries to effectuate 
culture change have appropriately targeted educational reform. For ex-
ample, after determining that Japanese children learned progressive val-
ues and Peruvian children did not, a Peruvian businessman established 
the Institute of Human Development in 1990 in Peru to promote the 
“Ten Commandments of Development: order, cleanliness, punctuality, 
responsibility, achievement, honesty, respect for the rights of others, re-
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spect for the law, work ethic, and frugality.”306 The Institute’s works 
have been adopted by Nicaragua’s Minister of Education in his own 
educational reform projects and by Mexico’s prestigious Monterrey In-
stitute of Technology and Higher Studies.307 
Lest one too blithely disparage efforts to institute change through the 
educational system, it is important to note that scholars have long stud-
ied how “education constructs culture.”308 The works of Pierre Bourdieu 
demonstrate that “‘the central role that schools have in both changing 
and in reproducing social and cultural [structures]…from one generation 
to the next.’”309 As Bourdieu explains,  
If it be accepted that culture…is a common code enabling all 
those possessing that code to attach the same meaning to the 
same words, the same types of behavior and the same works, 
then it is clear that the school…is the fundamental factor in the 
cultural consensus in as far as it represents the sharing of a com-
mon sense which is the prerequisite for communications.310 
Education would play a vital role in the construction and reshaping of 
such cultural traditions—whether to promote frugality, trust, delaying 
gratification, sacrificing for the national interest, the time value of 
money—by adopting “a process of formalization and ritualization”311 
and “‘organizing cultural productions,’”312 as undertaken by Japan dur-
ing the Meiji restoration period. 
Although the degree of the state’s involvement may vary, in terms of 
“official encouragement, outright subsidies, and governmental coordina-
tion,”313 there is clearly a concerted effort in some developing countries 
to engage in culture change—whether as a human rights matter, as in 
efforts to eradicate female genital mutilation, or as an economic devel-
opment issue. This process includes the construction of social capital 
through educational reform and various forms of civic participation 
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which resemble, in broad strokes at least, the earlier efforts towards so-
cial management adopted by the Japanese. One could also imagine other 
forms of government involvement in culture change, for example, the 
government as a “meaning manager or meaning architect who has iden-
tified a social meaning that is to be transformed and must find the tech-
niques to achieve this transformation.”314 
This could be accomplished through the technique of tying, as Law-
rence Lessig puts it, by associating one act with “another social meaning 
that conforms to the meaning that the architect wishes the managed act 
to have.”315 Through education in schools and coordination with other 
civic organizations, these governments could promote certain virtues, 
such as saving and frugality necessary for capital accumulation; a fu-
ture-oriented mindset that encourages individuals to stop defining them-
selves primarily as occupiers of inherited social status; or a norm that 
makes individual accumulation of wealth acceptable or even desirable. 
This can be done by tying or associating the desired attributes, for ex-
ample, with national unity or patriotism. When South Korea faced a cur-
rency crisis in 1997 and a record $60 billion USD bailout by the IMF, a 
national drive, dubbed the “Nation-loving Gold Collection Cam-
paign,”316 succeeded in inducing, within the first two days, more than 
133,000 people to sell or donate over 22,000 pounds of gold to the gov-
ernment.317 
Certainly any effort by governments to change cultural meanings 
may be viewed pejoratively as propaganda, as a troubling form of “in-
dustrial policy for norm generation” resulting in “boundless and oppres-
sive state efforts to manipulate social norms.”318 Some may find it all 
the more “chilling”319 when undertaken by liberal states that do not as a 
matter of course engage in propaganda or brainwashing. Yet such efforts 
may already be pursued by governments, even in the United States.320 
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“Governments trade on standing social meanings to advance state ends,” 
which have ranged from promoting “family values” to exclude homo-
sexuals from social integration in the United States, for example, to 
constructing race and ethnic identities to build up nationalism in the 
former Yugoslavia.321 Depending on the nature of the state’s efforts to 
produce and reshape social and cultural norms, this effort towards norm 
construction and management may or may not raise the specter of 
“thought control.”322 It may if the government allows few other chan-
nels for citizens to be exposed to alternative or competing value sys-
tems, or if the government backs up its agenda with coercive forms of 
state action, as in North Korea or Cultural Revolution China. 
It is important at this point to clarify what it is I am not arguing. I am 
not claiming “that cultural managers could construct any culture they 
wish…or that ‘given the right social context, any social activity can be 
turned into a ritual at the whim of ritual specialists.’ Rituals, and the re-
ality they construct, depend upon the values of the parties to that rit-
ual.”323 I am also not arguing that “backward” cultures are the cause of 
economic underdevelopment. But I am suggesting that there is some re-
lationship between culture and economic productivity—the degree to 
which a relationship exists will depend upon the particularities of his-
tory, economics, and politics. Acknowledging that such a link exists, 
however, does not mean that culture should be used to “deflect[] atten-
tion from other factors which might provide an equally compelling ex-
planation of underdevelopment.”324 The World Trade Organization and 
other institutions of the international economic system may in fact be 
structurally problematic, as evidenced by the exclusion from WTO 
rules, until recently, of textiles and agriculture: two areas in which de-
veloping countries have a comparative advantage. 
I will end this section with a look at how an indigenous Third World 
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institution—the Grameen Bank founded by an economist from Bangla-
desh—encourages certain cultural change in its borrowers. Unlike tradi-
tional banks which make loan determinations based on the borrower’s 
access to collateral or his or her general creditworthiness, the Grameen 
Bank does not require collateral of the conventional kind. Instead, it re-
lies on social collateral. The bank lends to a circle of five members, 
typically women. It grants a loan to the first two borrowers. If the first 
two repay their loans, the other individuals in the circle are entitled to 
loans. Those who received a loan are responsible, by their repayment or 
non-repayment, for whether or not others are qualified to borrow.325 
In addition, the bank undertakes to introduce a social development 
agenda to its borrowers, as reflected in the “Sixteen Decisions” which 
Grameen borrowers are expected to adopt.326 The purpose of the bank is 
to help people in poor countries cross the poverty line economically and 
also to live “a life of dignity and honour.”327 The bank believes that al-
though “credit is an efficient instrument that can quickly augment in-
come, poverty has many dimensions,”328 which include social and po-
litical consciousness; Grameen Bank’s “Sixteen Decisions” reflect the 
bank’s effort to address the social elements of poverty. 
At weekly meetings, borrowers agree to follow and advance these 
principles of Grameen Bank: “Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard 
Work.”329 The purpose of the sixteen decisions is to encourage sound 
financial discipline as well as to instill in borrowers certain social 
goals.330 Borrowers are encouraged to memorize and recite the Sixteen 
Decisions, some of which deal with mundane subjects such as sanitation 
(“‘We shall build and use pit latrines’”), nutrition (“‘We shall grow 
vegetables all year round’”), as well as more sensitive topics.331 Exam-
ples of the latter include the pledge to educate their children; not take 
any dowry at sons’ weddings and not give any dowry at their daughters’ 
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weddings; not practice child marriage;332 and not overspend on wed-
dings and funerals.333 The underlying principle behind the Sixteen Deci-
sions is nurturing pride334 and discipline,335 including a “deferral of self-
ish gratification by saving and educating children for example.” This 
effort is in fact not different from that taken by Japan, when it pursued 
culture change, in the 1800s, as I described above. 
CONCLUSION 
In the post-September 11 world, with development elevated into a na-
tional security issue, it is especially important to assess the field’s over-
arching principles. I have demonstrated that law and development has 
been focused almost exclusively on the formal aspects of law, on codes 
and legislation and courts. It has neglected the less quantifiable, though 
crucial, task of changing habits, mindsets, traditional ideas, or what I 
call, in this Article, culture. This Article advocates a fundamental shift 
in law and development work—a reinvigoration that focuses on culture 
and on culture change. 
I have provided several explanations for the neglect of culture in law 
and development. First, other scholarly fields most directly connected to 
law and development also shun culture. International law, public and 
private, has historically avoided culture. For public international law, 
culture is subsumed within each state’s domestic jurisdiction. Public in-
ternational law purports to articulate universal rules; as culture is par-
ticularistic, reflecting the history and tradition of individual states, pub-
lic international law sidesteps internal cultural issues. Private 
international law, or international economic law, also disregards culture, 
but on different grounds. Private international law is about business and 
economics; its stated aim is to establish an international economic 
framework that is stable, predictable, and rational. To the extent that 
culture is generally considered “messy,” non-tangible, or arbitrary, in-
herited or not freely chosen, it is not equated with rationality and thus 
not a matter private international law wishes to address or incorporate in 
its domain. To the contrary, private international law would prefer that 
culture be “cabined” and segregated from economic deliberations. 
Law and development as a scholarly field inherits the framework 
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erected by international law and thus is similarly reluctant to address 
cultural issues. In addition, most law and development scholars are from 
the liberal or critical tradition and thus are all too aware of the Oriental-
ist tradition that misinterprets and belittles non-European cultures. 
My aim in this Article is to examine culture and markets and to assert 
that there is, in fact, a link between the two. Where certain cultural at-
tributes retard the economic development of a country because it is eco-
nomically dysfunctional, I propose that deliberate efforts be taken to al-
ter such attributes. The Article, in other words, proposes that law and 
development take on the issue of culture change. This suggestion is 
based on a limited proposition—that if economic development is linked 
to culture and may be aided or impeded by culture, changing certain 
cultural practices and beliefs would facilitate economic development. It 
does not involve normative evaluations of any culture, nor does it at-
tempt to assess the intrinsic worth of any culture (beyond the relation-
ship between culture and economic development), nor does it preclude 
examination of historical and structural impediments to development. 
The field of human rights recognizes that certain human rights viola-
tions are rooted in cultural traditions. Such traditions must be altered in 
ways that reach deeper than legislation or codification. Ratified by 179 
states, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, for example, requires that signatory states promote equality by 
passing any necessary laws to eliminate discrimination against women 
and to promote the principle of the equality of men and women. But it 
also requires states to “modify the social and cultural patterns of con-
duct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of 
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the 
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes.”336 Cul-
ture change—changing cultural patterns of conduct as proposed by 
some human rights advocates—should be actively pursued in the field 
of law and development. 
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